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A FUNCTIONAL FRAMEWORK TO 
BALANCE ACCOUNTABILITY WITH THE 
NEEDS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS: INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION IMMUNITY POST-JAM 
By Trillium Chang* 
ABSTRACT 
Prior to 2019, international organizations were untouchable. These larger-than-life entities 
touch almost every corner of the international arena. Yet historically, international organizations 
enjoyed absolute immunity from liability in U.S. fora. 
Jam v. International Finance Corp., a 2019 Supreme Court case, shifted the entire landscape 
of international organization immunity. The Supreme Court held that international 
organizations are only entitled to the “same immunity” foreign sovereigns enjoy today. But in the 
wake of Jam, the Court left multiple interpretive issues unresolved. Critically, Jam now raises 
the question of how courts are to grant international organizations the “same immunity” as 
foreign sovereigns, especially since the two bodies of law have diverged over time. 
This Article aims to fill the gap. It first illustrates how Jam laid bare several interpretive 
difficulties. The Article then discusses why courts should restrain the impulse to apply foreign 
sovereign immunity jurisprudence wholesale to international organizations. Finally, the Article 
charts a rights-based functional framework that resolves Jam’s interpretive issues and weighs the 
needs of international organizations against accountability under the rule of law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Prior to 2019, international organizations were untouchable. 
Whenever a person engages in international activities, whether it be 
purchasing groceries that originate abroad, sending a postcard on 
vacation, or licensing a patent in a foreign country, chances are an 
international organization is involved. These larger-than-life 
organizations seemingly touched every corner of the international 
arena: from the obscure North Pacific Anadromous Fish 
Commission, which conserves migrating fish, to those with 
household names, like the United Nations, which runs a yearly 
budget of over $53 billion. Although these entities differed drastically 
in their composition, mandate, and functions, they held one thing in 
common. Whenever these strange legal entities—neither private 
citizens, corporations, or states—stumbled into U.S. courts, they 
always emerged unscathed. 
Prior to Jam v. International Finance Corp.,1 a Supreme Court 
case decided in March 2019, international organizations (“IOs”) 
enjoyed absolute immunity in U.S. courts. Under U.S. law, IOs are 
specialized intergovernmental agencies protected through executive 
order. Immunity rules are part and parcel of international and U.S. 
laws governing IOs. Whenever new IOs are created, standard 
immunity rules are usually specified in the constituent instruments of 
the organization, whether it be in multilateral treaties or headquarter 
agreements. Yet in the United States, Congress created an additional 
layer of immunity for IOs under the International Organizations 
Immunities Act (IOIA).2 Prior to 2019, courts interpreted the IOIA 
 
 1 Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 139 S. Ct. 759 (2019). 
 2 See International Organizations Immunities Act, Pub. L. No. 79-291, 59 
Stat. 669 (1945) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 288-288l) (2020) [hereinafter 
International Organizations Immunities Act]; infra Part II.B. 
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to mean that IOs enjoy absolute immunity in U.S. fora.3 Under this 
legal regime, the IOIA cloaked IOs with an impenetrable shield from 
liability under almost all circumstances. 
Jam, however, created a chink in the armor of IO immunity.4 
For the first time, the Supreme Court interpreted the IOIA as 
granting IOs restrictive—not absolute—immunity. The Court held 
that IOs enjoy the “same immunity” that foreign sovereigns are 
entitled to at the present moment. 5 In other words, IOs are stripped 
of liability under circumstances where foreign sovereigns do not 
enjoy immunity. Today, IOs may be exposed to liability in the United 
States for the very first time. 
But in the wake of Jam, multiple interpretive issues remain 
unanswered. Jam raises the thorny question of how courts should 
grant IOs the “same immunity” from suit that foreign governments 
enjoy today. The Supreme Court did not resolve these derivative 
interpretive issues. And although lower courts may be tempted to 
apply the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) jurisprudence 
wholesale to the IOIA, this is ultimately untenable because the two 
statutory schemes have diverged over time. At bottom, IO immunity 
is based on a different entity, context, and framework.6 
At the time of writing, no literature has addressed this 
interpretive gap laid bare by Jam. While IO immunity cases percolate, 
lower courts now have to break unchartered grounds.7 Judges need a 
 
 3 See, e.g., Atkinson v. Inter-American Dev. Bank, 156 F.3d 1335 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998) (finding that the International Organization Immunity Act (“IOIA”) 
granted the Inter–American Development Bank immunity from garnishment); 
Broadbent v. Org. of Am. States, 628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that under the 
IOIA, the Organization of American States was shielded from a lawsuit by its 
employees for alleged improper discharge); Brzak v. United Nations, 551 F. Supp. 2d 
313 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that under the IOIA, the United Nations and its 
former officials were immune from suit for alleged violations of Title VII and the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act). 
 4 Jam, supra note 1; see infra Part II.B. 
 5 Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 771-72. 
 6 See infra Part III. 
 7 Multiple cases related to International Organization (IO) immunity are 
now pending or being decided by lower courts. These courts must now address the 
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framework to resolve these interpretive questions. And crucially, this 
framework is imperative for putting IOs on notice and for allowing 
plaintiffs to seek redress. 
Ultimately, this Article proposes a functional framework to 
resolve the interpretive difficulties exposed by Jam.8 This framework 
allows courts to grant IOs the “same immunity” as foreign sovereigns 
while balancing the needs of IOs against accountability under the rule 
of law. 
This Article first illustrates how Jam left open the interpretive 
issue of how courts should grant IOs the “same immunity” from suit 
as foreign governments. The Article then discusses why courts 
should restrain the impulse to apply FSIA jurisprudence whole cloth 
to IOs. Finally, the Article charts a functional framework that 
resolves the interpretive issues following Jam and allows courts to 
weigh its various values. 
Part I first provides a background on the history of IOs: how 
IOs first emerged, their historical context, and evolution. Next, it 
briefly describes IOs and their characteristics. It then lays out an 
empirical survey of active IOs recognized by the United States 
through a statute. 
Next, Part II analyzes the evolution of IO immunity and its 
relationship to foreign sovereign immunity. It illustrates how foreign 
sovereign immunity evolved from absolute to restrictive immunity. It 
also illustrates how, although IO immunity and foreign sovereign 
immunity initially developed in parallel, the two bodies of law 
 
interpretive issues left open by Jam, supra note 1. See, e.g., Complaint & Demand for 
Jury Trial, Doe v. Int’l Fin. Corp., No. 1:17-cv-01494-UNA (D. Del. Oct. 24, 2017) 
(International Finance Corporation (IFC) sued for financing palm oil corporations 
that allegedly dispossessed and murdered Honduran farmers); Francisco S. v., Aetna 
Life Ins. Co., No. 2:18-cv-00010-EJF, 2020 WL 1676353 (D. Utah Apr. 6, 2020) 
(World Bank Group sued for breach of contract); Rodriguez v. Pan Am. Health Org., 
No. 18-cv-24995-GAYLES, 2020 WL 1666757 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2020) (Pan 
American Health Organization sued over employment dispute); Renje Zhan v. World 
Bank, No. 19-cv-1973 (DLF), 2019 WL 6173529 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2019) (World 
Bank sued over alleged failure to compensate contractors). 
 8 See infra Part IV. 
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eventually diverged and took a life of their own. And finally, it 
explains how Jam introduced a shift in the landscape of IO immunity, 
where IOs are now subject to restrictive, not absolute, immunity. 
Part III turns to the interpretive issues left in the wake of Jam 
and argues against reading the FSIA jurisprudence wholesale into IO 
immunity. After Jam, courts are tasked with granting IOs the “same 
immunity” as foreign sovereigns.9 Yet given the long evolution of 
foreign sovereign immunity, and the more extensive jurisprudence 
under that statute, applying its case law directly to the IO context is 
not workable for three reasons. First, applying FSIA case law 
wholesale does not actually grant IOs the “same immunity” as 
foreign sovereigns. To illustrate this point, this Article provides an 
empirical overview of the level of immunity specified in the 
constituent documents of IOs. This overview demonstrates that IOs, 
even without applying the FSIA, already enjoy far more protection 
than foreign sovereigns in U.S. courts. This observation cuts against 
applying FSIA wholesale to the IO context. 
Second, applying FSIA wholesale to IO immunity results in 
impracticable interpretive difficulties. These difficulties are rooted in 
FSIA’s distinction between sovereign and private acts. Since IOs do 
not possess sovereignty, this distinction cannot easily be applied in 
the IO context. 
Third, the legislative history of the IOIA demonstrates that 
IOs derive their immunity from a need to maintain their autonomy 
and independence, not out of an imperative to respect the autonomy 
of other sovereigns. This desire to protect IO functions indicates that 
a functional approach in determining IO immunity is more faithful to 
the IOIA’s legislative intent. 
Finally, Part IV proposes a rights-based functional framework 
for courts to determine what IO activities should be cloaked with 
immunity. This Article advances a functional framework that allows 
courts to balance the operational needs of IOs against other judicial 
 
 9 Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 771-72. 
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values, such as accountability under the rule of law and fairness to 
litigants. 
I. BACKGROUND TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IMMUNITY 
The birth of IOs goes hand in hand with the wave of 
internationalism that followed World War I and II. This 
internationalism was coupled with an urgency to collaborate and 
reconstruct the world through intergovernmental bodies, also known 
as “international organizations.” And in order to protect the 
autonomy and functions of IOs, sovereign states granted IOs 
immunity in their fora. 
This Part discusses (A) the history of IOs; (B) general 
characteristics of IOs; (C) the evolution of IO immunity. 
A. History of International Organizations 
IOs came into existence in a milieu of reconstruction 
following World War I and II. The League of Nations was the first 
attempt at an IO that was multilateral, universal, and democratic.10 
Following the heels of World War I, the international community—
fifty states strong—formed the League to keep the peace.11 Its 
founders also intended the League to facilitate a more orderly 
management of world affairs, whether it be political, economic, 
financial, or cultural.12 The League derived its legal force from the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, the first twenty-six articles of the 
Treaty of Versailles imposed on Germany and its allies.13 Yet 
 
 10 Isabella Löhr, The League of Nations, LEIBNIZ INST. OF EUROPEAN HIST. 
(Aug. 17, 2015), http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/transnational-movements-and-
organisations/international-organisations-and-congresses/isabella-loehr-the-league-
of-nations. 
 11 F.S. NORTHEDGE, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: ITS LIFE AND TIMES 1 
(1st ed. 1986). 
 12 Id. 
 13 See Treaty of Versailles art. 1-26, June 28, 1919. By signing onto the 
Treaty of Versailles, the contracting parties agreed to create a new international 
body, the League of Nations, to “promote international co-operation and to 
achieve international peace and security.” Id. at pmbl. 
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ultimately the League brought neither peace nor collaboration, but 
instead caved in on itself and paved the way to World War II.14 
IOs, however, went through a reincarnation after the Second 
World War. The war jolted a push towards collaboration, both for 
strategic purposes during the war and for reconstruction efforts after 
the war.15 With the failures of the League still seared in their minds, 
the world’s leaders sought to create long-lasting institutions that 
would deter aggression and maintain peace.16 
These efforts culminated in the founding of the United 
Nations: a first of its kind IO that aspired for a new world order 
where member states worked collaboratively towards peace and 
security. Through its quasi-governmental organs—such as the 
General Assembly, Security Council, and the International Court of 
Justice—the United Nations carries out its mandate to maintain 
peace and security, protect human rights, advance the rule of law and 
development.17 
Crucially, the genesis of the United Nations spurred the 
formation of IOs with more specific mandates.18 After World War II, 
the Allies advocated for other affiliate institutions, with the hopes of 
targeting more specific policy areas, regional issues, and political 
agendas. For instance, neighboring states formed regional alliances 
like the Organization of American States and the European 
Community (now the European Union). Similarly, states established 
specialized institutions focused on the cooperation around, regulation 
of, and development of various subject matters, ranging from the 
 
 14 Historians have provided a whole slew of reasons explaining why the 
League of Nations collapsed. But scholars generally agree that the League’s failure 
stemmed for its inability to provide adequate security guarantees for its members. 
See Jari Eloranta, Why Did the League Fail?, 5 CLIOMETRICA 27, 46-47 (2011). 
 15 DAVID CLARK MACKENZIE, A WORLD BEYOND BORDERS: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 33 
(2010). 
 16 PAUL KENNEDY, THE PARLIAMENT OF MAN: THE PAST, PRESENT AND 
FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 31-32 (2007). 
 17 See The Three Pillars, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw
/the-three-pillars/ (last visited June 2, 2020). 
 18 BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 494 (7th ed. 2018). 
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human condition (e.g., World Health Organization, International 
Labor Organization) to highly technical matters (e.g. International 
Atomic Energy Agency). Of note, a group of IOs concerned with 
economic regulation, collectively known as the “Bretton Woods 
Institutions,” also emerged.19 These finance institutions, such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, were tasked with 
placing the international economy on a sound footing after the war.20 
Today, all of these entities are referred under the umbrella term 
“international organizations,” and they have become a ubiquitous 
presence in international relations and law.21 
B. Characteristics of International Organizations 
In general, legal scholars agree that IOs share three 
characteristics.22 First, IOs are unique in the sense that their members 
are generally sovereign states, not individuals.23 IOs may limit 
membership to states from a particular region or to states concerned 
with a discrete subject matter. But at a minimum, two states must be 
involved. Sometimes, IOs may involve actors that are not states.24 
For instance, IOs themselves are sometimes founding member of 
other IOs, as in the case of the EU acting as a founding member of 
the World Trade Organization.25 
 
 19 See generally JOHN F. CHOWN, A HISTORY OF MONETARY UNIONS 
(2003); ERIC HELLEINER, FORGOTTEN FOUNDATIONS OF BRETTON WOODS: 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE MAKING OF THE POSTWAR ORDER 
(2014). 
 20 THE WORLD BANK, A GUIDE TO THE WORLD BANK 29 (3d ed. 2011). 
 21 See generally IAN HURD, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: POLITICS, 
LAW, PRACTICE (3d ed. 2018); DAVID C. MACKENZIE, A WORLD BEYOND 
BORDERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS (2010). 
 22 See JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS LAW 1-14 (3d ed. 2015). 
 23 Id. at 9-10. 
 24 Id. at 9. 
 25 See The European Union and the WTO, WTO, https://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.htm (last visited July 2, 
2020). 
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Second, IOs are generally formed on the basis of a treaty 
specifying its mandate and functions.26 IOs are borne from a legal act 
governed by international law, rather than under some domestic legal 
system. And since IOs are created under international law, they are 
also governed by international law.27 IOs are generally established to 
carry out specific functions which characterize their activities.28 Yet 
not all IOs are formed by treaties. Some IOs may be formed by a 
legal act of another existing IO. For example, the United Nations, an 
IO itself, has established several other IOs by General Assembly 
resolutions, such as the World Food Program29 and the United 
Nation’s Children Emergency Fund.30 
Finally, IOs are “organs with a distinct will.”31 At least one 
organ of the IO must have a “will distinct from the will of its 
member states.”32 This characteristic is why IOs have much stronger 
claims to privileges and immunities, than non-governmental 
organizations or private corporations.33 To justify this special 
treatment, IOs cannot simply be a tool of member states. Instead, an 
IO must have a distinct will “in order to justify its raision d’etre and 
its somewhat special status in international law.”34 And by possessing 
this distinct will—a will that is independent of the aggregate opinion 
of its members—IOs are able to boast a stronger claim to immunities 
than private entities. 
And so, IOs are organizations created by states on the basis 
of a treaty and an organ with a distinct will. Given these 
characteristics, IOs occupy a unique position in international law and 
 
 26 See KLABBERS, supra note 22, at 10-12. 
 27 Id. 
 28 See G.A. Res. 66/100, at 3 (Dec. 9, 2011) (“Unlike States, international 
organizations are established for specific functions which characterize their 
activities. They are very diverse, given the enormous variety in their size, 
membership, functions and resources.”). 
 29 See G.A. Res. 1714 (XVI) (Dec. 19, 1961). 
 30 See G.A. Res. 57(I) (Dec. 11, 1946). 
 31 See KLABBERS, supra note, 22, at 12-13. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
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are granted privileges and immunities distinct from other legal 
personalities. 
C. Current Status of International Organizations 
Currently, U.S. law recognizes sixty-seven active IOs.35 These 
sixty-seven active IOs are headquartered across a range of countries, 
with twenty in the US (30%), eleven in Switzerland (17%), seven in 
France (10%), five in Canada (7%), four in the U.K. (6%), and twenty 
in other countries (30%).36 The majority of IOs headquartered in the 
United States are based in Washington D.C. or New York.37 
The most common type of IOs are financial institutions and 
IOs with specialized technical expertise. Both types of IOs each make 
up 21% of the total number of active IOs with protections under the 
IOIA.38 Of note, these financial institutions include the World Bank 
Group,39 the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,40 
and the African Development Fund.41 IOs with technical expertise 
 
 35 A total of ninety-nine IOs were recognized by statute under the IOIA. 
See 22 U.S.C. § 288. Of these ninety-nine IOs, eleven IOs had their immunity 
revoked, while seventeen are currently inactive. See App. I. Currently, a remaining 
sixty-seven IOs are active. 
 36 See tbl. I for the full breakdown of headquarters. 
 37 For instance, the United Nations is headquartered in New York. See 
Agreement Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, Oct. 31, 1947. The 
World Bank Group is headquartered in Washington D.C. See Articles of Agreement, 
WORLD BANK, https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/articles-of-agreement (last 
updated Jan. 19, 2019). 
 38 See tbl. I for the full breakdown of the different types of IOs. 
 39 The World Bank Group includes five IOs: (a) International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); (b) International Development 
Association (IDA); (c) International Finance Corporation (IFC); (d) Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA); (e) International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID). About the World Bank, WORLD BANK, https://
www.worldbank.org/en/about (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
 40 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was 
founded in 1991 to “create a new post-Cold War era in central and eastern 
Europe.” The EBRD is formed by sixty-nine member states, as well as the 
European Union and European Investment Bank. Who We are, EBRD, https://
www.ebrd.com/who-we-are.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
 41 The African Development Fund provides concessional funding for 
economic and social development projects in thirty-eight member states based in 
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include the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization 
(INTELSAT),42 the World Intellectual Property Organization,43 and 
the European Space Agency.44 Political alliances also make up a fair 
share of IOs (18%). The most notable political alliance is the United 
Nations, which in turn also has several specialized agencies that are 
afforded protections under the IOIA.45 
II. EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IMMUNITY 
This Part focuses on the transition of IO immunity from 
absolute to restrictive immunity following Jam v. International Finance 
Corp.46 In the past, courts construed the International Organizations 
Immunities Act (IOIA) to mean that IO immunity is absolute, where 
IOs could not be sued in U.S. courts under any circumstances. Yet in 
2019, the Jam Court reinterpreted the IOIA to grant IOs only 
restrictive immunity, where IOs may be subject to suit under specific 
circumstances. 
 
Africa. About the ADF, AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FUND, https://www.afdb.org/
en/about-us/corporate-information/african-development-fund-adf/about-the-adf 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
 42 International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) 
is an IO with 149 member states and was established to ensure that 
“communication by means of satellite should be available to the nations of the 
world as soon as practicable on a global and non-discriminatory basis.” About Us, 
ITSO, https://itso.int/about-us/(last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
 43 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is a specialized 
United Nations agency that “promote[s] the protection of intellectual property 
throughout the world through cooperation among States and, where appropriate, in 
collaboration with any other international organization.”[.]” See Convention 
Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization art. 3, July 14, 1967. 
 44 The European Space Agency (ESA) has twenty-two member states and 
“shape[s] the development of Europe’s space capability.” About ESA, ESA, 
https://www.esa.int/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
 45 Examples include the World Health Organization, International 
Organization for Migration, World Meteorological Organization, World Postal 
Union, Food and Agricultural Organization. 
 46 Jam, supra note 1. 
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A. The International Organizations Immunities Act 
In 1945, Congress passed the IOIA to extend certain 
privileges, exemptions, and immunities to IOs.47 Given the critical 
role the United States played in the establishment of IOs, U.S. 
lawmakers understood the need to create a legal regime for IOs to 
function. Since the United States was one of leading participants and 
funders of IOs, it was considered a “practical certainty” that many of 
the IOs would locate, or at least conduct many of its activities, in the 
United States.48 The United States acknowledged that IO member 
states demanded assurance that IOs would be accorded 
independence and would not be so easily subject to suit.49 The United 
States also recognized that although IOs were composed of sovereign 
nations that individually enjoyed sovereign immunity, IOs, as well as 
their personnel, were exposed to liability just like private parties.50 
Conscious of these political considerations surrounding IOs, 
Congress passed the IOIA in December 1945 to “protect[] the 
official character of international organizations located in this 
country,” and to “strengthen the position of the international 
organizations of which the United States is a member when they are 
located or carry on activities in other countries.”51 
 
 47 See International Organizations Immunities Act, supra note 2. 
 48 Steven Herz, International Organizations in U.S. Courts: Reconsidering the 
Anachronism of Absolute Immunity, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 471, 488 (2008). 
 49 Josef L. Kunz, Privileges and Immunities of International Organizations, 41 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 828, 836 (1947). 
 50 This friction came to a head when the United States became increasingly 
involved in IOs after World War II. The tension was largely a result of the U.S. 
Treasury’s demands for income and other taxes, which was resented by IO 
officials. Lawrence Preuss, The International Organizations Immunities Act, 40 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 332, 334 (1946); see also Letter from the Director General of the United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency to the Secretary of State, in Sponsorship 
by the Department of State of Legislation Resulting in the International 
Organizations Immunities Act of 1945 (1945), 1 Foreign Rel. U.S. 1557, 1557 
(letters between the United Nations and the U.S. Secretary of State on the need for 
international immunities legislation) [hereinafter IOIA Letters]. The legislative 
history of the IOIA also refers to tax matters. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, 1st Sess. 1, 
at 2-5 (1945) [hereinafter 1945 House Report]. 
 51 1945 House Report, supra note 50, at 2. 
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The IOIA is essentially a jurisdictional statute, where issues of 
personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and immunity from 
suit are intermingled.52 For the purposes of the IOIA, an IO is an 
organization in which the United States has a relationship through 
treaty or act of Congress and is designated by the President to receive 
privileges and immunities under the IOIA.53 IO immunity operates as 
a bar to subject matter and personal jurisdiction.54 And so, a court 
must rule on the immunity claim before it can adjudicate on the 
merits of the case. If proper service is made on an IO, then personal 
jurisdiction exists for claims where there is federal subject matter 
jurisdiction. Federal subject jurisdiction, in turn, exists when the IO is 
not entitled to immunity. As such, under the IOIA’s structure, a 
court must first determine whether the IO defendant is immune from 
suit in order for the court to determine whether there is personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction. If the court finds an IO to immune, the 
court lacks both personal and subject matter jurisdiction. By contrast, 
if the court finds that one of the exceptions to the immunities 
applies, the court can establish personal and subject matter 
jurisdiction.55 
B. Scope of International Organization Immunity Pre-Jam 
Although the IOIA grants IOs immunity from suit in the 
United States, it does not specify the exact ambit of IO immunity. 
Instead, it states that IOs, designated through executive order,56 
“shall enjoy the same immunity from suit and every form of judicial 
process as is enjoyed by foreign governments.”57 And so, the level of 
IO immunity accorded is closely tethered to how courts have 
 
 52 See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2012). 
 53 22 U.S.C. § 288 (2012) (noting that an IO “means a public international 
organization in which the United States participates pursuant to any treaty or under 
the authority of any Act of Congress . . . , and which shall have been designated by 
the President through appropriate Executive order as being entitled to enjoy the 
privileges, exemptions, and immunities provided in [the IOIA].”) 
 54 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605. 
 55 This is, of course, assuming proper service has been made and there are 
no violations of constitutional or due process requirements. 
 56 See 22 U.S.C. § 288 (listing public international organizations formerly 
and currently entitled to enjoy certain privileges, exemptions, and immunities). 
 57 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b). 
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historically interpreted foreign sovereign immunity. This Subpart 
describes how international organization and foreign sovereign 
immunity developed in lockstep, its divergence over time, and 
subsequent convergence in Jam. 
1. Interpretation of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
Because the immunity IOs enjoy under the IOIA is tethered 
to the “same immunity” of foreign governments,58 the interpretation 
of the IOIA must be viewed in the light of foreign sovereign 
immunity. Up until 1952, the State Department subscribed to the 
theory of absolute immunity for foreign sovereign governments.59 In 
effect, foreign governments were entitled to virtually absolute 
immunity “as a matter of international grace and comity” under 
almost all circumstances.60 Under this absolute immunity regime, “if 
the Executive announced a national policy in regard to immunity 
generally, or for the particular case, that policy was law for the courts 
and binding upon them, regardless of what international law might 
say about it.”61 
But by the mid-1950s, the presumption that states enjoyed 
absolute immunity in foreign courts began to unravel. In 1952, the 
State Department announced through the Tate Letter that it now 
 
 58 Id. 
 59 Prior to the codification of the FSIA, the United States routinely granted 
absolute immunity to foreign sovereigns. See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (holding that the French government should be 
immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts given the “perfect equality and 
absolute independence of sovereigns, and [a] common interest impelling them to 
mutual intercourse, and an interchange of good offices with each other.”); Berizzi 
Bros. Co. v. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926) (reasoning that foreign sovereign 
immunity also applies to commercial ships because “maintenance and advancement 
of the economic welfare of a people in time of peace [is no less] a public purpose 
than the maintenance and training of a naval force”). 
 60 Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 765-66. 
 61 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 56 (2d ed. 1997). 
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subscribed to a new or “restrictive theory of sovereign immunity,” 
rather than absolute immunity.62 
Three factors pushed the United States towards the adoption 
of this restrictive immunity regime.63 First, an increasing number of 
states began to adopt restrictive immunity. This created an 
asymmetry: while the United States was more liable in foreign courts, 
it continued to grant foreign governments absolute protection in U.S. 
courts.64 Second, the Department stated that this new theory was 
necessary because of the “widespread and increasing practice on the 
part of governments of engaging in commercial activities”65 and 
international commerce through state-run businesses.66 Absolute 
theory undermined U.S. business interests,67 since private entities 
entering into business with foreign governments could not be certain 
that courts would be able to resolve legal disputes.68 Since 
governments were acting more like private parties, it was “necessary” 
to “enable persons doing business with [foreign governments] to 
have their rights determined in the courts.”69 In response, the U.S. 
government negotiated fourteen bilateral treaties with foreign nations 
between 1948 and 1958, each party agreeing to waive sovereignty 
when operating commercial activities in each other’s jurisdiction.70 
 
 62 Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, to 
Acting U.S. Att’y Gen. Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP’T ST. 
BULL. 984 (1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter]. 
 63 CARTER ET AL., supra note 18, at 644. 
 64 Id. 
 65 See Tate Letter, supra note 62, at 984-85. 
 66 CARTER ET AL., supra note 18, at 644. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Hearing on H.R. 11315 Before the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 24, 26-27 (1967) (testimony of Monroe Leigh) 
(“[F]rom the standpoint of the private citizen, the current system generates 
considerable commercial uncertainty. A private party who deals with a foreign 
government entity cannot be certain of having his day in court to resolve an 
ordinary legal dispute. He cannot be entirely certain that the ordinary legal dispute 
will not be artificially raised to the level of a diplomatic problem.”). 
 69 Tate Letter, supra note 62. 
 70 See Italy, Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, It.-U.S., July 
26, 1949, 63 Stat. 2225; Ir.-U.S., Jan. 21, 1950, 1 U.S.T. 785; 195; Colom.-U.S., Apr. 
26, 1951, S. EXEC. M, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.; Greece-U.S., Aug. 3, 1951, 5 U.S.T. 
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Third, absolute immunity was thought to be inconsistent with 
the U.S. government’s own sovereign immunity in its own courts.71 
For instance, the 1887 Tucker Act granted the Court of Claims (now 
the Court of Federal Claims) jurisdiction to render judgment on a 
whole variety of commercial and contractual claims against the U.S. 
government except for tort, equitable, and admiralty claims.72 And 
the 1946 Federal Tort Claims Act grants federal court jurisdiction to 
entertain suits against the U.S. government for common law torts 
committed by government employees.73 Notably, the Federal Tort 
Claims Act states that “[t]he United States [is] liable . . . in the same 
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like 
circumstances.”74 
And so, under this restrictive theory of foreign sovereign 
immunity, “the immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard 
to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect 
to private acts (jure gestionis).”75 Instead, immunity should only be 
granted “with respect to causes of action arising out of a foreign 
state’s public or governmental actions.”76 On the flip side, sovereign 
states are not entitled to immunity for their “commercial and private 
activities.”77 
 
1829; Isr.-U.S., 5 U.S.T. 550; Den.-U.S., Oct. 1, 1951, 12 U.S.T. 908; Japan-U.S., 
Apr. 2, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 2063; Ger.-U.S., Oct. 29, 1954, 7 U.S.T 1839; Haiti, -U.S., 
Mar. 8, 1955, S. Exec. H., 84th Cong., 1st Sess.; Nicar.-U.S., Jan. 21, 1956, 9 U.S.T. 
449; Neth.-U.S., Mar. 27, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 2043; Kor.-U.S., Nov. 28, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 
2217. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Iran-U.S., Aug. 
15, 1955, 8 U.S.T 899. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Economic 
Development, Uru.-U.S., Nov. 23, 1949, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 109-9 (1950). 
 71 CARTER ET AL., supra note 18, at 644. 
 72 See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2010) (“The United States Court of Federal Claims 
shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States 
founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of 
an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United 
States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.”). 
 73 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012). 
 74 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012). 
 75 Tate Letter, supra note 62. 
 76 Alfred Dunhill v. of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 698 
(1976). 
 77 Id. 
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To set these changing norms in stone, Congress enacted the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) in 1976. The FSIA was 
designed to “codify the so called ‘restrictive’ principle of sovereign 
immunity, as presently recognized in international law.”78 And so, the 
FSIA afforded foreign governments immunity from both suit and 
attachment, but subject to specific statutory exceptions. 
i. Exceptions under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
Under the theory of restrictive immunity, foreign sovereigns 
are subject to liability under a few exceptions. Some exceptions to 
immunity include torts committed by IOs or their employees,79 
property taken in violation of international law,80 action to enforce 
arbitration,81 and waiver of immunity.82  
The most important statutory exception to immunity arises 
when a commercial activity has a sufficient nexus with the United 
States.83 This exception embodies the animating principle of 
restrictive immunity: that foreign sovereigns should not be entitled to 
immunity when they act like private entities.84 The commercial 
activity exception is one the most widely invoked exceptions to 
immunity under the FSIA.85 If a foreign state brings a lawsuit in U.S. 
fora, it is denied immunity when the underlying activity qualifies as a 
“commercial activity,” rather than a sovereign act.86 Under the 
commercial activity exception, a foreign sovereign is presumptively 
 
 78 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 2 (1976). 
 79 International Organizations Immunities Act, supra note 2. 
 80 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). 
 81 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6). 
 82 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1). 
 83 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603, 1605(a)(2). 
 84 See Tate Letter, supra note 62. 
 85 CARTER ET AL., supra note 1819, at 665. 
 86 A suit can satisfy the commercial activity exception in one of three ways: 
either the suit must be (i) “based upon a commercial activity carried on in the 
United States by the foreign state”; (ii) based upon “an act performed in the United 
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere”; or 
(iii) based upon “an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with 
a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct 
effect in the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
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immune from suit in federal court. This presumption erodes, 
however, if the suit concerns the sovereign’s commercial activities or 
transaction. Commercial activity includes a “broad spectrum of 
endeavor, from an individual commercial transaction or act to a 
regular course of commercial conduct.”87 
To determine whether a claim falls under the commercial 
activity exception, courts inquire into whether the act is a sovereign 
and private act. Under the FSIA, the commercial activity exception 
applies when the lawsuit is “based upon a commercial activity” with 
specified connections to the United States.88 Courts differentiate 
between sovereign and private acts when determining what qualifies 
as a “commercial activity.” The FSIA defines “commercial activity” 
to mean “either a regular course of commercial conduct or a 
particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of 
an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the 
course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by 
reference to its purpose.”89 
Crucially, this definition does not define what is 
“commercial.” The first sentence simply establishes that whether an 
act is commercial does not depend on whether it is a regular course 
of conduct or particular transaction.90 And the second sentence 
merely states that the commercial activity should be determined by 
the nature, not the purpose, of the act. 
To address this ambiguity, the Supreme Court developed a 
test (“commercial activity test”) for what constitutes “commercial 
activity.” This test distinguishes between activity that rises from 
“powers peculiar to sovereigns” and “those powers that can also be 
exercised by private citizens.”91 If the latter, the activity meets 
definition of a “commercial activity.” Put another way, a sovereign 
government engages in commercial activity under the FSIA when it 
acts “in the manner of a private player,” as distinct from acts that are 
 
 87 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1310, at 15 (1976). 
 88 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
 89 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d). 
 90 Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 612 (1992). 
 91 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 360-61 (1993). 
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exclusively exercised by sovereign governments.92 Of note, the 
commercial character of the act is determined by its “nature” not its 
“purpose.”93 And so, whether an act is a commercial activity turns on 
whether the type of action is one exclusive to sovereign 
governments.94 Jurisdictional consequences flow from this distinction 
between sovereign and private acts. If an act is private, it does not 
qualify as a commercial activity and thus does not fall within the 
commercial activity exception. 
In general, courts have found that a sovereign entity engages 
in a “commercial activity” when it conducts business in the public 
market and makes a profit. For instance, in Republic of Argentina v. 
Weltover, the Supreme Court found that the issuance of Argentinian 
government bonds to be a “commercial activity.”95 Although 
Argentina had a public purpose of addressing a domestic credit crisis, 
the bonds were “garden-variety debt instruments” that could be 
similarly issued by private parties.96 The bonds “may be held by 
private parties,” were negotiable, “may be traded on the international 
market,” and “promise[d] a future stream of cash income.”97 And so, 
the Court held that there is “nothing distinctive about the state’s 
assumption of debt” that would cause it be always classified as “jure 
imperii,” that is state acts of sovereign rather than commercial 
nature.98 Courts have also found sovereign acts as “commercial 
activity” in a whole spectrum of contexts, from public procurement,99 
public services,100 to general contracting,101 to just name a few. 
 
 92 Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992). 
 93 Id. at 607-08; 28 U.S.C. 1603(d) (“The commercial character of an 
activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or 
particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.”). 
 94 Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 607-08 (1992). 
 95 Id. at 620. 
 96 Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614-15. 
 97 Id. at 615. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Texas Trading v. Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 100 Rush-Presbyterian-St. LU.K.e’s Medical Center v. Hellenic Republic, 877 F.2d 
574, 578 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 101 Egypt v. Lasheen, 603 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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By contrast, courts have held that acts that are unique to 
sovereign states and cannot be exercised by private parties are not 
“commercial activities.” Acts that are not subject to the commercial 
activity exception “emanate from the power inherent in 
sovereignty.”102 These sovereign acts are usually political or public 
acts that private parties cannot perform. These acts have traditionally 
included internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of 
noncitizens; legislative acts, such as nationalization; acts concerning 
armed forces; acts concerning diplomatic activity; and public loans.103 
In fact, although the FSIA is just a few decades old, this 
approach to sovereign immunity—by drawing distinctions between 
private and sovereign acts—dates to the founding era. More than two 
centuries ago, a federal court declined to apply immunity where the 
foreign power had a “commercial character.”104 And as early as the 
1800s, the Supreme Court has drawn “a clear distinction is to be 
drawn between the rights accorded to private individuals or private 
trading vessels, and those accorded to public armed ships which 
constitute a part of the military force of the nation.”105 And so, a state 
that departs from its unique role as a sovereign is akin to a “private 
citizen or merchant.”106 
2. Interpretation of the International Organizations Immunities 
Act 
But while the interpretation of the FSIA transitioned from 
absolute to restrictive immunity, IO immunity failed to keep step 
 
 102 BP Chemicals v. Jiangsu, 285 F.3d 677, 681-82 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 103 Victory v. Comisaria, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964). 
 104 Ellison v. The Bellona, 8 F. Cas. 559, 559 (D.S.C. 1798). 
 105 The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 143, 3 L.Ed. 
287 (1812); see also The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 353, 5 L.Ed. 454 
(1822); Bank of the U.S. v. Planters’ Bank of Ga., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 907, 6 L.Ed. 
244 (1824) (“It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a 
partner in any trading company, it devests itself, so far as concerns the transactions 
of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen. 
Instead of communicating to the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it 
descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the character 
which belongs to its associates, and to the business which is to be transacted.”). 
 106 Guevara v. Republic of Peru, 468 F.3d 1289, 1296 (1964). 
2021 A Functional Framework 9:2 
145 
with its analogue statute: even though the two bodies of law are 
closely intertwined by statute. IO immunity is interlaced with foreign 
sovereign immunity because the IOIA states that IOs “shall enjoy the 
same immunity from suit and every form of judicial process as is 
enjoyed by foreign governments.”107 
When the IOIA was first codified in 1945, courts construed 
“same immunity” as granting IOs absolute immunity, since foreign 
sovereigns in 1945 enjoyed absolute immunity. 108 But as the law 
surrounding foreign sovereign immunity began to evolve109—where 
foreign sovereigns were accorded restrictive, not absolute, 
immunity—IO immunity failed to keep pace. IOs were still entitled 
to absolute immunity, even though foreign sovereigns were now 
subject to restrictive immunity. Courts concluded that the “same 
immunity . . . as is enjoyed by foreign governments” language in the 
IOIA referred to the immunity foreign governments enjoyed at the 
time of IOIA’s enactment: that is, absolute immunity.110 And so, 
while foreign governments were subject to suit when the claim fell 
within the commercial activity exception, IOs were never subject to 
suit, regardless of the nature of the claim.111  
This discrepancy between IO immunity and foreign sovereign 
immunity created rampant confusion in the courts.112 For example, 
the Third Circuit held that “[w]ell established rules of statutory 
interpretation demonstrate” that the IOIA confers no more 
 
 107 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) (1945). 
 108 Id. 
 109 See supra Part II.B.1. 
 110 Atkinson v. Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, 156 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 111 Since IOs enjoyed absolute immunity, the type of claim did not matter 
for the purposes of immunity. See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976). 
 112 The Third Circuit and D.C. Circuit were in direct disagreement over 
whether the IOIA granted absolute or restrictive immunity. Compare OSS Nokalva, 
Inc. v. Eur. Space Agency, 617 F.3d 756, 762-63 (3d Cir. 2010) with Atkinson, 156 F.3d 
1335 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The district courts were also deeply split. See e.g., Enterasys 
Networks, Inc. v. Mexmal Mayorista, S.A. de C.V. (In re Dinastia, L.P.), 381 B.R. 512, 
519-20 (S.D. Tex. 2007); Banco de Seguros del Estado v. Int’l Fin. Corp., Nos. 06 Civ. 
2427(LAP) & 06 Civ. 3739(LAP), 2007 WL 2746808, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 
2007); Ashford Int’l, Inc. v. World Bank Grp., No. 1:04-CV-3822-JOF, 2006 WL 
783357, at *2-3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 24, 2006). 
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immunity on international organizations than the FSIA affords to 
foreign states.113 That is, the IOIA only grants IOs restrictive 
immunity. In direct contrast, the D.C. Circuit held that IOIA cloaks 
international organizations with “the immunity of foreign 
organizations in 1945.”114 The Supreme Court of Alaska also adopted 
the D.C. Circuit’s position, holding that “[t]he IOIA provides 
absolute immunity to international organizations.”115 And district 
courts in three other circuits also adopted the D.C. Circuit’s holding 
in Atkinson.116 
3. Transition to Restrictive International Organization 
Immunity Post-Jam 
This tension between IO immunity and foreign sovereign 
immunity came to a head in the Supreme Court case Jam v. 
International Finance Corp.117 In 2018, the United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to hear claims from Indian farmers adversely 
affected by the Coastal Gujarat Power Plant. This case concerned the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), an IO that provides loans 
and grants to private-sector projects in lower-income countries.118 
The IFC was designated by executive order as an IO protected under 
the IOIA.119 
 
 113 OSS Nokalva, Inc. v. Eur. Space Agency, 617 F.3d 756, 762-63 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
 114 Atkinson, 156 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 115 Price v. Unisea, Inc., 289 P.3d 914, 920 (Alaska 2012). 
 116 See Enterasys Networks, Inc. v. Mexmal Mayorista, S.A. de C.V. (In re 
Dinastia, L.P.), 381 B.R. 512, 519-20 (S.D. Tex. 2007); Banco de Seguros del Estado v. 
Int’l Fin. Corp., Nos. 06 Civ. 2427(LAP) & 06 Civ. 3739(LAP), 2007 WL 2746808, at 
*3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2007); Ashford Int’l, Inc. v. World Bank Grp., No. 1:04-CV-
3822-JOF, 2006 WL 783357, at *2- 3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 24, 2006). 
 117 Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 139 S. Ct. 759 (2019). 
 118 The International Finance Corporation is the private sector arm of the 
World Bank Group. About IFC, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, 
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporat
e_site/about+ifc_new (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). The purpose of the IFC is to 
“assist in financing the establishment, improvement and expansion of productive 
private enterprises” in lower income countries. International Finance Corporation 
Articles of Agreement art. I(i), June 27, 2012, as amended. 
 119 Exec. Order No. 10680, 21 Fed. Reg. 7647 (Oct. 2, 1956). 
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In 2007, IFC contributed $450 million to fund the Coastal 
Gujarat Power Plant, 120 a plant located in Gujarat, India with the 
capacity to meet 2% of India’s power needs.121 All clients receiving 
funding from the IFC must comply with the group’s sustainability 
framework which includes environmental and social performance 
standards.122 From the outset, IFC classified the large scale coal-
powered plant as a Category A project—the highest risk category—
given its potential for “significant adverse social and environmental 
impacts that may be diverse and irreversible.123 Yet despite these 
risks, the IFC greenlighted the project. 
The Gujarat farmers ultimately sued the IFC.124 The farmers 
alleged that the power plant polluted the air, land, and water in the 
 
 120 IFC to Lend Rs 1,800 Crore to Tata’s Power Project, THE ECONOMIC TIMES 
(Apr. 9, 2008, 3:49 PM), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/
power/ifc-to-lend-rs-1800-crore-to-tatas-power-project/articleshow/2937878.cms. 
 121 TATA POWER, TATA POWER MUNDRA ULTRA MEGA POWER PROJECT: 
TOWARDS A CLEANER AND GREENER FUTURE 8-9; Plants and Projects: CGPL 4150 
MW, TATA POWER, https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/read/11752972/
tata-power-mundra-ultra-mega-power-project- (last visited June 23, 2019). 
 122 Environmental and Social Performance Standards, IFC, https://www.ifc.org
/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/
sustainability-at-ifc/policies-standards/performance-standards (last visited June 23, 
2019). 
 123 IFC Project Information Portal: Tata Ultra Mega, IFC, https://
disclosures.ifc.org/#/projectDetail/ESRS/25797 (last visited June 23, 2019). IFC 
defines Category A projects as “business activities with potential significant adverse 
environmental or social risks and/or impacts that are diverse, irreversible, or 
unprecedented.” Environmental and Social Risk Categorization, IFC, https://
www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/
sustainability-at-ifc/policies-standards/es-categorization (last visited June 23, 2019). 
 124 This case has an extensive legal history that dates even before the 
Gujarat farmers filed in U.S. court. The case was first filed with the International 
Finance Corporation’s (IFC) Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO), the IFC’s 
internal dispute resolution mechanism. See COMPLAINT FROM MACHIMAR 
ADHIKAR SANGHARSH SANGATHAN (MASS: ASSOCIATION FOR THE STRUGGLE 
FOR FISHWORKERS RIGHTS) REGARDING TATA ULTRA MEGA (June 11, 2011), 
http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/document-links/documents/TataMundra
CAOComplaint_June112011.pdf (last visited July 2, 2020). The CAO issued a 
report concluding that the IFC had failed to ensure the project met the 
Environmental and Social standards required for IFC projects. See OFFICE OF THE 
COMPLIANCE ADVISOR OMBUDSMAN, CAO AUDIT OF IFC INVESTMENT IN 
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surrounding area and sought damages and injunctive relief.125 In 
response, the IFC claimed absolute immunity from suit under the 
IOIA, arguing that the IOIA grants IOs the “same immunity” from 
suit that foreign governments enjoyed at the time of the IOIA’s 
enactment in 1945.126 The Gujarat farmers argued, however, the IFC 
is entitled to the “same immunity” from suit that foreign 
governments are entitled to today: restrictive immunity.127 The 
Gujarat farmers reasoned that the IFC is no longer entitled to 
absolute immunity since foreign governments may be subject to suit 
under exceptions to the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(FSIA). 
The Court ultimately ruled in favor of the Gujarat farmers, 
holding that the IOIA “grants international organizations the ‘same 
immunity’ from suit ‘as is enjoyed by foreign governments’ at any 
time.”128 In the majority’s reading, Congress framed the words “same 
immunity” dynamically, where “same as” creates a continuous 
relationship between the referencing statute (the FSIA) and the 
referred statute (IOIA).129 Accordingly, the IOIA “link[s] the law of 
international organization immunity to the law of foreign sovereign 
immunity, so that the one develops in tandem with other.”130 Put 
differently, since foreign governments currently enjoy restrictive 
immunity,131 post-Jam, so too do IOs enjoy restrictive immunity.132 
The final section of the majority opinion addresses the web 
of immunities IOs may be entitled to. The majority explains that the 
immunities accorded by the IOIA “are only default rules.”133 And 
 
COASTAL GUJARAT POWER LIMITED, INDIA 15-43 (2013), http://www.cao-
ombudsman.org/cases/document-links/documents/CAOAuditReportC-I-R6-
Y12-F160.pdf (last accessed July 2, 2020). The report also found that the FIC failed 
to take necessary steps to protect the local community and the environment. Id. 
 125 Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 139 S. Ct. 759, 764-65 (2019). 
 126 Id. at 767-68. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. at 778 (emphasis added). 129 Id. at 768-69. 
 129 Id. at 768-69. 
 130 Id. at 769. 
 131 See supra Part II.B. 
 132 Jam, 139 S. Ct., at 772. 
 133 Id. at 771. 
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that “if the work of a given international organization would be 
impaired by restrictive immunity, the organization’s charter can 
always specify a different level of immunity.”134 Functionally, this 
means that although Jam has held that IOs enjoy restrictive immunity, 
IOs can specify a higher level of immunity in their constituent 
documents. 
Jam, of course, holds significant consequences for IOs, as IOs 
can no longer operate under the assumption that all of their 
operations are immune from suit.135 Yet the Court left multiple 
interpretive issues unresolved. Critically, Jam now raises the question 
of how courts are to grant IOs the “same immunity” as foreign 
sovereigns, especially since the two bodies of law have diverged over 
time. Part III illustrates Jam’s interpretive gap and why courts should 
refrain from applying the FSIA wholesale to the IO context. 
III. “SAME IMMUNITY” BUT DISTINCT ENTITIES: THE 
INAPPLICABILITY OF THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY CASE 
LAW TO THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION CONTEXT 
Post-Jam courts are tasked with according IOs the “same 
immunity” that foreign governments enjoy today.136 But the Jam 
court did not delineate how courts are to determine this same level of 
immunity. 
At first blush, courts may be tempted to apply the FSIA 
jurisprudence to IO immunity whole cloth, for instance by directly 
 
 134 Id. 
 135 The import of this case, of course, did not escape IOs. This is 
evidenced by the numerous amici filed by IOs. See, e.g., Brief for Member Countries 
and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 139 S. Ct. 759 (2019) (No. 17-1011), 2018 WL 
4504285; Brief for International Bank for Reconstruction and Development et al. 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 139 S. Ct. 759 
(2019) (No. 17-1011), 2018 WL 4504286; Brief for the African Union, Food and 
Agriculture Organization, and Great Lakes Fishery Commission et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 139 S. Ct. 759 (2019) (No. 
17-1011), 2018 WL 4522294. 
 136 See Jam, 139 S. Ct., at 767-68. 
2021 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 9:2 
150 
importing FSIA exceptions and case law to IO immunity. This 
approach may seem like a simple solution, but it is ultimately 
unworkable. Although IO and foreign sovereign immunity are tied at 
the hip by statute, the two bodies of law have diverged over time and 
taken a life of their own. Decades of case law from the foreign 
sovereign immunity cannot simply be transplanted onto IO immunity 
in one fell swoop. 
This Article argues against applying FSIA exceptions and case 
law wholesale to IO immunity for three reasons. First, applying the 
FSIA to IO immunity does not result in IOs enjoying the “the same” 
level of immunity as that of foreign governments.137 Second, the 
conceptual bases for IO immunity does not support the direct 
application of the FSIA to determine IO immunity. Third, applying 
the FSIA wholesale to the IO context results in unworkable 
interpretive difficulties. 
A. Applying Foreign Sovereign Immunity Body of Law Wholesale to 
International Organization Immunity Does Not Grant 
International Organizations “The Same” Immunity as That of 
Foreign Sovereigns 
The foremost reason why FSIA case law should not be 
directly applied to IO immunity is that doing so would not grant IOs 
“the same immunity from suit that foreign governments enjoy today 
under the FSIA.”138 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the FSIA is the 
sole and exclusive basis for foreign sovereign immunity.139 Put another 
 
 137 See 22 U.S.C. § 288. 
 138 Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 761. 
 139 See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (foreign states “shall be immune from the 
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided 
in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.”); Argentina v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 
488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989) (holding that the FSIA “ provides the sole basis for 
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in the courts of this country”); see also 
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993) (holding that “a foreign state is 
presumptively immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts[,] unless a 
specified exception [under the FSIA] applies”). This is also supported by FSIA’s 
legislative history. See, e.g., H. R. REP. NO. 94-1487 ¶ 12 (1976) (H. R. Rep.); S. Rep. 
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way, in the United States, foreign sovereigns are only entitled to the 
level of protections specified by the FSIA. In direct contrast, IOs 
enjoy multiple levels of protection from liability. IOs enjoy at least 
five overlapping sources of immunity. These sources include 1) 
constituent documents; 2) other international agreements such as 
headquarters agreements; 3) customary international law; 4) the 
IOIA. 
As a threshold matter, IOs are able to specify their own level 
of immunity through their own constituent documents.140 In fact, out 
of the sixty-seven active IOs protected under the IOIA,141 twenty-
one IOs, or 31%, grant themselves absolute immunity in their 
founding documents.142 This means that the founding agreements for 
31% of IOs require member states to grant them immunity from suit 
under all circumstances. The United Nations, for instance, requires 
member states to grant it “immunity from every form of legal process 
except insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived its 
immunity.”143 And the Bretton Woods Agreement provides that the 
International Monetary Fund “shall enjoy immunity from every form 
of judicial process except to the extent that it expressly waives its 
immunity.”144 Courts almost always respect the level of immunity 
 
No. 94-1310, pp. 11-12 (1976) (S. Rep.) (FSIA “sets forth the sole and exclusive 
standards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity raised by 
sovereign states before Federal and State courts in the United States,” and 
“prescribes . . . the jurisdiction of U.S. district courts in cases involving foreign 
states”). 
 140 As described previously, the IOIA merely sets the default level of IO 
immunity. The Jam Court clarified that IOs are free to specify a higher level of 
immunity in their constituent documents. See supra Part II.B.3; Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 
771-72 (“[T]he organization’s charter can always specify a different level of 
immunity. The charters of many international organizations do just that.”). 
 141 See supra Part I.C; app. I. 
 142 See app. I. 
 143 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations art. II, 
§ 2, Feb. 13, 1946, 21 U.S.T. 1422, T. I. A. S. No. 6900. 
 144 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund art. IX, § 3, 
Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1413, T. I. A. S. No. 1501. 
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specified in the IO’s constituent document, unless the IO explicitly 
waives immunity.145 
Many IOs also enjoy an extra layer of protection through 
headquarters agreements, treaties that regulate the status and 
privileges of an international organization in the territory of a host 
state.146 Headquarter agreements frequently grant immunity to IO 
officials and representatives of member states. For instance, in 1947, 
the United Nations and the United States signed a headquarter 
agreement establishing the headquarters of the United Nations in 
New York City.147 This headquarters agreement also grants the 
United Nations a whole array of diplomatic immunity.148 Moreover, 
the Agreement permits the General Assembly to promulgate 
regulations for the headquarters that supplant any U.S. federal, state, 
or local law.149 Similarly, the headquarters agreement between the 
United Kingdom and the European Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development states that “Persons Connected with the Bank shall . . . 
 
 145 See, e.g., Nyambal v. International Monetary Fund, 772 F.3d 277, 281 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014) (holding that “jurisdictional discovery against international organization 
protected by International Organizations Immunity Act (IOIA) may be warranted 
only in comparatively rare circumstances” and that the International Monetary 
Fund was entitled to absolute immunity pursuant to its Articles of Agreement); 
Brzak v. United Nations, 597 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that the United 
Nations “enjoys absolute immunity from suit unless ‘it has expressly waived its 
immunity.’”) (citing Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations art. II, § 2, Feb. 13, 1946, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 1418). 
 146 See Headquarters Agreements, THE EUCLID TREATY, https://
www.euclidtreaty.org/headquarters-agreements/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2020). 
 147 See Agreement Between the United Nations and the United States of 
America Regarding the Headquarters of the United States, June 26, 1947 
(establishing the headquarters of the United Nations in New York city); 
Headquarter Agreement Between the Organization of American States and the 
Government of the United States of America, May 14, 1992 (establishing the 
headquarters of the Organization of American States in Washington, D.C.). 
 148 See Agreement Between the United Nations and the United States of 
America Regarding the Headquarters of the United States, at art. V. 
 149 Id. at art. III. 
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be immune from jurisdiction and legal process, including arrest and 
detention.”150 
And third, many scholars argue that IOs enjoy immunity 
under customary international law (CIL). There is a recognition in 
recent scholarship that “some form of immunity—sometimes, even 
absolute immunity—is part of international law.”151 CIL is a primary 
form of international law.152 It is defined as a “general and consistent 
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal 
obligation.”153 Typically, national courts apply CIL as a rule of 
decision, defense, or canon of statutory construction.154 As such, 
even in the absence of treaties or constituent documents explicitly 
granting immunity, national courts may still grant immunity to IOs 
under the international law theory of CIL. 
And fourth, of course, IOs also enjoy immunity under the 
provisions set forth by the IOIA. For instance, IOs enjoy immunity 
from search and confiscation of any property and assets owned 
(unless immunity is waived),155 exemption from any internal-revenue 
taxes imposed, 156and officers of the IO are exempted from legal suit 
“relating to activities performed in their official capacity.”157 
Since IOs are already blessed with four sources of immunity, 
importing in FSIA exceptions and case law would not grant IOs “the 
 
 150 Headquarters Agreement Between the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development art. 15, Apr. 15, 1991. 
 151 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, reprinted in 
2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission pt. 2, ¶ 3 201-05 (2006); See 
Lalive, L’immunité de juridiction des Etats et des organisations internationales, in RECUEIL 
DES COURS 209, 304 (1953); E.H. Fedder, The Functional Basis of International Privileges 
and Immunities: A New Concept in International Law and Organization, 9 AM. U. L. REV. 
60 (1960). 
 152 See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary 
International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999). 
 153 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 154 Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 153, at 1113. 
 155 22 U.S.C. § 288(c). 
 156 § 288(b). 
 157 § 288(d). 
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same immunity from suit . . . as is enjoyed by foreign governments.” 
158 This is because foreign sovereigns derive immunity exclusively 
from the FSIA. Foreign sovereigns do not have constitutive 
documents that specify their desired level of immunity. Nor do they 
require headquarters agreements when operating within foreign 
territory. By contrast, IOs have multiple sources of immunity beyond 
the IOIA, including immunity from their constituent documents, 
other international agreements, customary law, and the IOIA. And 
so, applying FSIA whole cloth to IO immunity does not actually 
grant IOs the “same immunity” that foreign sovereigns currently 
enjoy. 
B. The Conceptual Basis of International Organization Immunity 
Does Not Support the Direct Application of FSIA Case Law 
What is more, the different conceptual bases of foreign 
sovereign and IO immunity militate against the wholesale application 
of the FSIA in determining the level of IO immunity.159 Unlike 
foreign sovereigns, IOs derive their immunity from a need to protect 
their functions, not from their claim to sovereignty. This difference in 
conceptual bases for immunity cuts against applying FSIA case law 
directly into the IO context, and calls for a more functional approach. 
Foreign states derive immunity from their sovereignty.160 
Under international law, sovereignty refers to when “the legal 
authority or competence of a State [is] limited and limitable only by 
international law and not by the national law of another State.”161 The 
basis of state immunity stems from the maxim par in parem imperium 
 
 158 22 U.S.C. § 288(a), (b). 
 159 See Niels Blokker, International Organizations: The Untouchables?, in 
IMMUNITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 2 (Niels Blokker & Nico 
Schrijver eds., 2015) (stating that “the rationale for [IO] immunity is different from 
that for state immunity. While state immunity is based on the par in parem non habet 
imperium principle, the immunity of international organizations is generally founded 
on the principle . . . [that] international organizations need immunity in order to be 
able to perform their functions.”). 
 160 See Robert B. von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 33, 34-37 (1978); see also Blokker, supra note 160, at 1-17. 
 161 See Hans Kelsen, The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for 
International Organization, 53 YALE L. J. 207, 208 (1944). 
2021 A Functional Framework 9:2 
155 
nonhabet (“an equal has no power over an equal.”).162 This maxim has 
its origins in traditional theories of international law, where the state 
is viewed as a juristic entity with distinct personality and is entitled to 
fundamental rights, including absolute sovereignty, exclusive control 
over a territory, and absolute independence.163 Part and parcel of 
these fundamental rights is also the acknowledgement of legal 
equality, the recognition that sovereigns exist as equals on the 
international plane.164 This recognition is based on a strict quid pro 
quo of reciprocity, where states respect the authority and territorial 
boundaries of other sovereigns, with the expectation that this respect 
will be reciprocated.165 The reciprocal independence of states is 
considered one the most universally respected principles of 
international law.166 As a result, states generally agree that other states 
cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of another against its will. 
Further, there is a consensus that state sovereignty inherently entails 
 
 162 The principle of par in parem non habet imperium states that “a state should 
not exercise over another state jurisdiction which it has but that (save in cases 
recognized by international law) a state has no jurisdiction over another state.” Jones 
v. Saudi Arabia (HL), 283, para 14, endorsing Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe [2000] 1 WLR 
1573 (HL) 1588 (Lord Millett); see generally EDWARD CHU.K.WUEMEKE OKEKE, 
JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
37-39 (2018) (describing the history of state immunity and legal equality). 
 163 Heybatollah Najandi-Manesh & Abdollah Abedini, Struggle Between State 
Immunity and Jus Cogens at the International Court of Justice, 10 INT’L STUD. J. 73, 84 
(2014). 
 164 Ernest K. Bankas, The Origins of Absolute Immunity of States, THE STATE 
IMMUNITY CONTROVERSY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (2005). 
 165 PETER H.F. BEKKER, THE LEGAL POSITION OF 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: A FUNCTIONAL NECESSITY ANALYSIS 
OF THEIR LEGAL STATUS AND IMMUNITIES 155 (1994). 
 166 The principles of reciprocal independence of states and legal equality 
have been widely adopted throughout domestic courts. See, e.g., The Prins Frederik, 2 
Dods. 451 (1820) (English case) (declining jurisdiction on the grounds that the 
foreign sovereign was equally sovereign and independent and that to implead the 
foreign would insult its “regal dignity”); Jones v. United Kingdom, (App. Nos. 
34356/06 and 40528/06), ECTECt HR Judgment, ¶ 188 (holding that state 
immunity “should be taken as a point of departure in any logical treatment of the 
topic” and that “[s]tate immunity [is] the general rule.”); Democratic Republic of Congo 
v. FG Hemisphere Associates LLC [2011] 4 HKC 151 (holding that Hong Kong’s laws 
on absolute immunity were still in force after its handover and rejecting the 
enforcement of an arbitral award against the Democratic Republic of Congo). 
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the right of each state to assert jurisdiction over litigation arising 
from its own acts.167 
Unlike foreign sovereigns, IOs derive their immunity from a 
protection of its functions, not their sovereignty.168 In general, legal 
scholars agree that IOs possess immunities necessary for the 
 
 167 Spanish Government v. Lamberge et Pujol, Cass. [Supreme Court of France] 
(1849). 
 168 Many legal scholars agree that the foremost rationale for granting 
immunities to international organizations is to “secure[] their independence and 
guarantee[] their functions.” AUGUST REINISCH, INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS 233 (2000); see also C. T. OLIVER ET 
AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 613 (4th ed. 
1995) (“The Privileges and immunities of international organizations are designed 
mainly to protect the independence of organizations from undue outside influence and 
otherwise to ensure that they are able to carry out their missions.”); Kunz, supra 
note 50, at 846-52 (1947) (“The only adequate method [of protecting international 
organizations] is to grant these immunities in [a] basic international treaty, creating 
identical and binding international obligations upon all Member States.”); Lawrence 
Preuss, The International Organizations Immunities Act, 40 AM. J. INT’L L. 332 (1946) ( 
“This legislation constitutes belated recognition of the need for granting to 
international organizations of which the United States is a member, and to their 
personnel, a legal status which is adequate to ensure the effective performance of 
their functions and the fulfillment of their purposes.”); Michael Singer, Jurisdictional 
Immunity of International Organizations: Human Rights and Functional Necessity Concerns, 36 
VA. J. INT’L L. 53, 64-67 (1995); see also Jurisdictional Immunities of Intergovernmental 
Organizations, 91 YALE L. J. 1167, 1180-83. And according to the International Legal 
Commission, the justification for organizational immunity lies in their aim to 
“guarantee the autonomy, independence and functional effectiveness of 
international organizations and protect them against abuse of any kind.” Fourth 
Report on Relations Between States and International Organizations, [1989] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 153, 157, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/424 (Apr. 24, 1989).. In its report on the 
privileges of international organizations, the Council of Europe also noted that the 
independence of the organization is the main reason for according IOs privileges 
and immunities. Conseil de l’Europe (ed.), Privile`ges et immunitie ́s des organisations 
internationales, Resolution (69) 29 adopte ́e par le Comite ́ des Ministres du Conseil de l’Europe 
le 26 septembre 1969 et rapport explicatif 12 (1970). Moreover, IOs also argue that the 
fundamental purpose of its immunities is to protect the functions the IO has been 
tasked with. See OFFICE OF THE LEGAL COUNSEL OF THE FAO, 1982 U.N. JURID. 
Y.B. (arguing that the “fundamental purposes for which immunity from legal 
processes was accorded to intergovernmental organizations” is to “ensure that the 
intergovernmental organizations concerned could carry out their aims smoothly 
and independently.”). 
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fulfillment of their purposes and independence from any state’s 
control.169 An IO has no sovereignty or right to self-determination. It 
does, however, have a right, subject to obligations set out in its 
constituent instrument, to create and enforce policies appropriate to 
fulfill its purpose. As such, many IOs explicitly protect activities 
necessary for the fulfillment of its functions in its founding 
documents.170 
The basis of a functional approach to IO immunity is well-
established.171 It is widely accepted that IOs should enjoy a degree of 
immunity from the jurisdiction of national courts in order to achieve 
their founding objectives. This recognition is generally founded on 
the principle of “functional necessity”: the idea that “[a]n 
international organization shall be entitled to (no more than) what is 
strictly necessary for the exercise of its functions in the fulfilment of 
its purposes.”172 The doctrine of functional necessity assumes that 
without immunity, IOs would not be able to perform their functions 
because of interference in their work.173 Yet at the same time, over-
insulating IOs from judicial scrutiny may lead to IOs abusing their 
 
 169 See C. WILFRED JENKS, INTERNATIONAL IMMUNITIES 18 (1961); DEP’T 
OF STATE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE RESULTS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO 
CONFERENCE, Pub. No. 2349, 159 (1945) [hereinafter San Francisco Report] (“The 
United Nations, being an organization of all the member states, is clearly not 
subject to the jurisdiction or control of any one of them.”). 
 170 The constituent documents of many IOs recognize the need to protect 
their functions from liability. See, e.g., Constitution of the World Health 
Organization art. 67(a) (1947) (“The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of 
each Member such privileges and immunities as may be necessary for the fulfilment 
of its objective and for the exercise of its functions.”); Charter of the Organization 
of American States art. 133 (1967) (“The Organization of American States shall 
enjoy in the territory of each Member such legal capacity, privileges, and 
immunities as are necessary for the exercise of its functions and the 
accomplishment of its purposes.”); Agreement Between the United Nations and 
the United States Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations § 2(b) (“The 
Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and 
immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.”). 
 171 See Blokker, supra note 160, at 1-7; see app. I (illustrating that over 
thirteen IOs invoke functional reasons when specifying privileges and immunities 
in their constituent documents). 
 172 BEKKER, supra note 166, at 5. 
 173 See Singer, supra note 169, at 54-55. 
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responsibilities.174 Accordingly, under this functional necessity 
doctrine, an organization should only be accorded immunities that 
are strictly necessary for it to achieve its organizational objectives.175 
In fact, the doctrine of functional necessity is so well-
established that a whole host of foreign national courts adopt a 
functional test when determining the level of IO immunity in their 
fora. For instance, Italian courts have inquired into the necessary 
functions of an IO when deciding whether to grant immunity in 
labor disputes.176 And the Netherlands Supreme Court has held that 
international organizations in the Netherlands enjoy functional 
immunity, where an IO “is in principle not subject to the jurisdiction 
of the courts of the host State in respect of all disputes which are 
immediately connected with the performance of the tasks entrusted 
to the organization question.”177 
Further, both the conceptual framework and legislative 
history of IO immunity supports a functional approach in 
determining the level of IO immunity.178 The history and purpose of 
the IOIA indicates that the basis for IO immunity is wholly different 
compared to that of foreign sovereign immunity.179 Close analysis of 
the legislative history of the IOIA evinces that IO immunity was 
specifically designed to “enable [the US] to fulfill its commitments in 
connection with its membership in international organizations.”180 
Prior to the enactment of the IOIA, IOs were not protected from 
liability in the United States. But the United States recognized that 
 
 174 REINISCH, supra note 4, at 234-35; BEKKER, supra note 173, at 48. 
 175 Kunz, supra note 50, at 836; Singer, supra note 173, at 56; REINISCH, 
supra note 169, at 56. 
 176 See Beatrice I. Bonafè, Italian Courts and the Immunity of International 
Organizations, IMMUNITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 262-69 (Niels 
Blokker & Nico Schrijver eds., 2015). 
 177 A. Spaans v. The Netherlands, 20 December 1985, Hoge Raad, NJ 
1986/438 [Supreme Court], ¶ 3.3.4, English translation available in 18 
NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987). 
 178 See supra Part III.B. 
 179 See Jurisdictional Immunities of Intergovernmental Organizations, 91 YALE L. J. 
1167, 1181-84. 
 180 1945 House Report, supra note 51, at 6. 
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IOs could be exposed to suit, just like private parties.181 As a result, 
the US codified IO immunity through the IOIA in 1945.182 
The codification of IO immunity was galvanized by the US’s 
membership in the United Nations.183 The Department of State 
drafted and sponsored the IOIA.184 And much of the drafting of the 
IOIA was influenced by a report written by the Secretary of State, 
documenting the US delegation to the San Francisco Conference on 
the United Nations Charter.185 This report concluded that in order to 
abide by the United Nations Charter’s immunities provisions, 
specifically Article 105 of the United Nations Charter,186 the United 
States—as a member of the United Nations—was required to enact 
legislation codifying IO immunity.187 And notably, the United 
Nations Charter required that it “enjoy in the territory of each of its 
Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the 
fulfilment of its purposes.” The IOIA, therefore, should be 
understood to confer immunities to IOs, not because of their 
sovereign nature, but because the need to protect their independence 
and functions.188 
 
 181 See supra Part II.A. 
 182 Id. 
 183 1945 House Report, supra note 51, at 2 (“Finally, the probability that the 
United Nations Organization may establish its headquarters in this country, and the 
practical certainty in any case that it would carry on certain activities in this country, 
makes it essential to adopt this type of legislation promptly. The committee 
considers that the passage of this legislation is essential to implement our 
participation in [the United Nations.]”). 
 184 1945 House Report, supra note 51, at 7. 
 185 See San Francisco Report, supra note 170 (“So far as the United States is 
concerned, legislation will be needed to enable the officials of the United States to 
afford all of the appropriate privileges and immunities due the [United Nations] 
and its officials under this provision.”) 
 186 Id. 
 187 U.N. Charter art. 105 (“The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of 
each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the 
fulfilment of its purposes.”). 
 188 See San Francisco Report, supra note 170 (“(“It accordingly seemed 
better to lay down as a test the necessity of the independent exercise of the 
functions of the individuals in connection with the Organization.”), 
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Although some scholars have argued that IOs derive 
immunity from its members189—individual states that enjoy 
sovereignty in their own right—this argument is ultimately untenable. 
Practically speaking, an IO is not an association or extension of 
states. Rather, it is an entity that was established through treaty 
among states. To be sure, it is difficult to draw a clear line between a 
state and a closely unified association of states that blurs into a 
unified entity. But no such entity exists. The closest example is the 
European Union, where the twenty-seven member states function 
under a standardized system of laws that allow free movement of 
people, goods, services, and capital within the internal market.190 Yet 
individual states in the European Union still exercise sovereignty and 
control their territories exclusively.191 It is possible, although unlikely, 
that European integration may reach a point where it eventually 
subsumes all member states. Only in that scenario would an IO truly 
be a federation of states and only then would it be able to derive its 
sovereignty from the member states. But very few IOs are even 
structured to ease its transition into statehood. The only plausible 
candidates are regional organizations, like the European Union.192 
And even for these IOs, progression to statehood is highly 
unlikely.193 
 
 189 See, e.g., ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 46-47 (1994) (“[O]ther international organizations, 
which have the [ ] indicia of international legal personality, are truly international 
actors in their own right.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. IV, subch. B, ¶ 467, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1987) 
(“In some cases, an international organization might be considered a grouping of 
individual states entitled to the privileges and immunities of the constituent 
states.”). 
 190 The EU in Brief, EUROPEAN UNION, https://europa.eu/european-
union/about-eu/eu-in-brief_en (last visited July 2, 2020). 
 191 See generally DESMOND DINAN, ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION (2d ed. 2014). 
 192 Some regional organizations include the Organization of American 
States, African Union, East African Community, Economic Community of West 
African States. 
 193 The recent backlash against the European Union that culminated in 
Brexit captures this tension. Most supporters of Brexit opposed the EU’s 
progression to a more federated state, worrying about the loss of British 
sovereignty. See Alex Barker, Brexiters Fear ‘Biggest Loss of Sovereignty’ Since 1973, FIN. 
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The bottom line is that IOs, unlike states, do not derive their 
immunity from any notion of sovereignty. Instead, IOs are granted 
immunity out of a desire to protect their core functions and preserve 
their independence from states.194 And as evidenced by the IOIA’s 
legislative history, the United States granted IOs immunity so that 
IOs can carry out the mission they were created for in the first place. 
Since IOs and states have separate bases for their immunity, it stands 
to reason that it is inappropriate to read FSIA case law wholesale into 
the IOIA context. 
C. Applying the Case Law on FSIA Exceptions to International 
Organization Immunity Creates Unworkable Interpretive 
Difficulties 
Furthermore, directly applying the foreign sovereign 
immunity exceptions and its corresponding case law to international 
organization immunity creates a whole host of thorny interpretive 
difficulties. 
 
TIMES (July 9, 2018) (citing that the British ambassador believed that retaining the 
EU customs union and single market would “result in the biggest loss of U.K. 
sovereignty since accession in 1973.”). Brexit slogans crying out “take back 
control” illustrate an underlying anxiety that continuing down the path of 
federation of an international organization, the European Union, would erode the 
U.K.’s own sovereignty and control. Take the East African Community, a pan-
nation trade bloc in East Africa, as another example. The East African Community 
was borne out of the pan-African movement to encourage greater cooperation 
between East African countries, encourage socio-economic development, and 
boost the political and economic clout of the region. Baruti Katembo, Pan 
Africanism and Development: The East African Community Model, 4 J. PAN AFR. STUD. 
108 (2008). The mission of the East African Community is to “widen and deepen 
economic, political, social and cultural integration.” Pillars of EAC Regional 
Integration, EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITIES, https://www.eac.int/integration-pillars 
(last visited Mar. 18, 2020). The Community collapsed in 1977 because member 
states were unwilling to cede more power to the Community. See generally Agrippah 
T. Mugomba, Regional Organisations and African Underdevelopment: The Collapse of the 
East African Community, 16 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 261. Although the Community was 
revived again in 2000, the East African Community has still failed to consolidate a 
political federation. See CRAIG MATHIESON, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA THE EAST AFRICA COMMUNITY (EAC) 2016. 
 194 See supra Part II.A. The United States originally codified the IOIA in 
order to preserve the autonomy of IOs and to protect IOs from excessive lawsuits 
by nationals of the host state. 
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The very heartland of restrictive immunity in the foreign 
sovereign context is centered on the distinction between sovereign 
and private or commercial acts.195 This distinction is captured by the 
commercial activity exception.196 Not only is this exception the 
centerpiece of restrictive immunity, but it is also the exception that 
has gotten the most play in courts.197 But at bottom, this exception 
relies on a distinction between sovereign and private acts that is not 
easily applied to the IO context. 
The commercial activity exception turns on one central 
question: whether the underlying activity in question is based on a 
sovereign or private act.198 Yet this distinction sits uneasily within the 
context of international organization immunity because, at its core, 
international organizations lack sovereignty. 
IOs lack sovereignty because they do not possess physical 
control over territory, citizens, legal equality, and the ability to 
reciprocate immunity. As such, the distinction between private and 
sovereign acts under the commercial activity exception simply does 
not have any relevance in the IO context.199 
Unlike states, IOs do not possess several characteristics 
necessary for sovereignty.200 First, IOs do not have physical control 
over a territory. Under this Westphalian framework of sovereignty, an 
 
 195 See supra Part. II.B. 
 196 See id. 
 197 CARTER ET AL., supra note 198, at 665. 
 198 See supra Part. II.B. 
 199 See generally Alain Pellet, International Organizations Are Definitely Not States, 
RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 41-54 (M. Ragazzi ed., 
2013). 
 200 According to the Third Restatement, sovereign states possess four 
characteristics. First, they have a defined territory, where “[a]n entity may satisfy the 
territorial requirement for statehood even if boundaries have not been finally 
settled.” Second, the state must have “a population that is significant and 
permanent.” Third, the state must possess “some authority exercising 
governmental functions and able to represent the entity in international relations.” 
Fourth, the state must be able to “conduct international relations with other states, 
as well as the political, technical, and financial capabilities to do so.” RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1987). 
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entity is “sovereign” when there is a recognition of the entity’s right 
to exclusive authority within a given authority.201 But IOs do not 
have authority over a territory. Instead, IOs function within the 
territory of states under headquarter agreements or other treaties.202 
Second, IOs do not have citizens like states do.203 IOs merely 
have officials who are citizens of other member states. But these 
officials do not have additional protections or responsibilities from 
belonging to the international organization. 
Third, from a realist perspective, IOs do not enjoy legal 
equality with states under international law.204 Although international 
organizations are generally thought to be subject to customary 
international laws and jus cogens norms, IOs do not enjoy the same 
duties and rights as states. IOs do not have equal power as states in 
most international fora. For instance, they are not voting members in 
the United Nations and they cannot nominate judges on international 
courts. 
And lastly, the ability of states and IOs to leverage immunity 
differ on a fundamental level. In general, states have a level of 
autonomy not enjoyed by IOs because they are able to protect 
themselves from undue intrusion by invoking the principle of 
reciprocity.205 States can protect themselves not only through their 
ability to grant protection to other states, but also through their 
 
 201 Derek Croxton, The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty, 
21 INT. HIST. R. 569, 570 (1999). 
 202 See, e.g., Agreement Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, 
June 26, 1947; Articles of Agreement, WORLD BANK, https://www.worldbank.org/
en/about/articles-of-agreement (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
 203 To be a sovereign state, the entity “must have a population that is 
significant and permanent.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 204 See Kelsen, supra note 162, at 207, 209 (1944) (noting that legal equality 
refers to the “equality of capacity for duties and rights . . . that under the same 
conditions States have the same duties and the same rights). 
 205 The principle of reciprocity implies that state actions are contingent on 
rewarding reactions from other states and these actions cease when expected 
reactions are not reciprocated. See Robert O. Keohane, Reciprocity in International 
Relations, 40 INT. ORG. 1, 5-8 (1986). 
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ability to retaliate. Similarly, when it comes to immunities, states can 
both be a grantor and recipient of immunity. States generally grant or 
withhold immunity from each other based on agreements or 
principles of comity under international law. And because of the 
principle of reciprocity, states generally do not grant broader 
immunities than they receives.206 By contrast, this principle of 
reciprocity does not hold true for IOs. Although IOs may receive 
immunity by domestic courts, they are not able to grant or withhold 
immunity. IOs do not exercise jurisdiction over any person except, in 
limited circumstances, its own officials. As a result, IOs are only in 
the position of receiving, not granting, immunities. An IO that wishes 
to be shielded from liability cannot be asked to grant reciprocal 
immunity. And so, IOs do not have the incentives to police their own 
immunities. 
Given that IOs do not possess sovereignty, it is clear that 
applying FSIA case law wholesale to IO immunity creates difficult 
interpretive questions. The commercial activity exception requires an 
analysis of powers peculiar to the sovereign.207 But since IOs lack 
sovereignty, this test is essentially meaningless in the IO context. This 
interpretive difficulty was recognized by both the respondent and 
amici for Jam,208 but still remained unresolved in the Jam remand.209 
Applying the FSIA case law wholesale leads to absurd results as there 
 
 206 Singer, supra note 169, 53-55. 
 207 See supra Part II.B. 
 208 See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 139 S. Ct. 
759 (No. 17-1011), 2018 WL 509826 (“T]he imperii /gestionis distinction is 
inadequate to deal with these cases.”) (citing Singer, supra note 169, 63); Brief for 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, Jam, 139 S. Ct. 759 (2019) (No. 17-1011), 2018 WL 
4504286 (“The wholesale incorporation of the FSIA into the IOIA would raise a 
host of difficult questions regarding how to apply a statute specifically crafted for 
sovereigns to international organizations in general and MDBs in particular.”). 
 209 On remand, the court did not reach the question of whether the 
underlying activity in Jam, 139 S. Ct. 759, qualified as a “commercial activity.” 
Instead, the court found that the commercial activity exception does not apply 
because the plaintiffs did not establish that the suit is based on conduct in the 
United States. Jam., Civil Action No. 15-612 (JDB), 2020 WL 759199, at *4-7 
(D.D.C. Feb. 14, 2020). And so, courts still have yet to rule on how the sovereign 
and private distinction works in the context of the commercial activity exception 
post-Jam. 
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is no workable line to determine whether an international 
organization is subject to suit. All in all, these interpretive difficulties 
under the commercial activity exception cuts against applying the 
FSIA case law wholesale to the IO context. 
IV. RIGHTS-BASED FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION IMMUNITY 
Judges need a roadmap on how to apply the holdings of Jam 
to future IO immunity cases. But as illustrated in Part III, the urge to 
apply FSIA exceptions and case law wholesale to the IO context is 
facile and ultimately unworkable. 
Rather than transplanting FSIA case law wholesale into the 
IO context, this Article proposes an alternative framework for courts 
to determine IO immunity post-Jam: a functional approach that is 
simultaneously anchored in a system of rights and corresponding 
obligations established by international law. This approach not only 
upholds Jam, granting IOs the “same immunity” as foreign 
sovereigns, but it is also more faithful to the animating principles 
granting IOs immunity in the first place. Further, this framework 
enables courts to delicately balance IO immunity with human rights 
considerations. 
This Part (A) illustrates the mechanics of this rights-based 
functional approach; (B) explains why a functional approach is 
superior to applying FSIA whole cloth to IO immunity. 
A. Mechanics of a Functional Approach to International 
Organization Immunity 
This Article advances a rights-based functional approach in 
determining the level of IO immunity in U.S. courts. Under this 
framework, an IO is exclusively entitled to immunity for activities that 
are strictly necessary for the exercise of its functions and the 
fulfilment of its purposes.210 At bottom, this Article proposes that a 
rights-based functional approach to IO immunity would require the 
 
 210 See supra Part III.A. 
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court to engage in a three-step inquiry: 1) What is the function and 
purpose of the IO? 2) What is the “gravamen” of the suit? 3) Does 
the “gravamen” overlap with the function and purpose of the IO? 
Under this framework, if the gravamen of the lawsuit overlaps with 
the function and purpose of the IO, then the IO is entitled to 
immunity. Here, this Article outlines how courts could adopt this 
three-step functional approach. 
1. Determining the Function and Purpose of the International 
Organization 
The first step of this functional approach is to determine the 
function and purpose of the defendant IO. This is the most critical 
step of the approach as whether IOs will be accorded immunity will 
largely turn on the scope of the IO’s function and purposes. 
Courts should look at the IO’s specific constituent 
documents and its internal policies and standards. Since IOs are 
formed on the basis of treaties,211 the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Laws of Treaties (VCLT) provides some insight on how to 
determine the function and purpose of IOs.212 The VCLT is the 
“treaty of treaties”: the treaty that regulates treaties between states.213 
It is known as one of the most important instruments governing 
treaty law and is widely considered as customary international law on 
the law of treaties.214 
 
 211 See KLABBERS, supra note 23; supra Part I.B. 
 212 See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 ILM 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 213 IAN MCTAGGART SINCLAIR & IAN ROBERTSON SINCLAIR, THE 
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 3 (1984). 
 214 The United States signed the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT) on April 24, 1970. Although the U.S. Senate has not given advice 
and consent on the treaty, the United States considers “many of the provisions of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to constitute customary 
international law on the law of treaties.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. 
STATE DEPARTMENT, https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.html. 
See also 50 Years Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UNIVERSITÄT WIEN 
(Nov. 18, 2019), https://juridicum.univie.ac.at/news-events/news-detailansicht/
news/50-years-vienna-convention-on-the-law-of-treaties/?tx_news_pi1%5
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Article 31 of the VCLT outlines the hierarchy of 
interpretation for treaties. First, a treaty “shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given in the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”215 Second, the treaty should also take into account “any 
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or application of its provision”216 and “any 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty.”217 
And so, the inquiry into the function and purpose of an IO 
should start with the ordinary meaning of the IO’s constituent 
documents.218 For many IOs, the preamble or opening articles list a 
set of purposes or principles of the IO.219 Yet these purposes are 
generally very broad and do not shed light on whether the subject of 
the suit squarely falls within the functions and purposes of the IO. 
To discern the more specific functions of an IO, a court should then 
inquire into the “subsequent agreement”220 and “subsequent 
practice”221 in the application of the treaty. These subsequent 
agreements and practices can include the IO’s secondary materials, 
such as its rules, standards, policies, and guidance issued by the IO 
while fulfilling its mission and function. For instance, the 
environmental, social, and governance standards set by IOs can 
provide insight on what activities are considered acceptable by the IO 




 215 Vienna Convention, supra 214 art. 31(1). 
 216 Id. at art. 31(2)(a). 
 217 Id. at art. 31(2)(b). 
 218 Id. at art. 31(1). 
 219 See, e.g., International Monetary Fund Articles of Agreement art. (I)(i)-
(vi) (listing the purposes of the International Monetary Fund); International 
Finance Corporation Articles of Agreement art. I (stating that the purpose of the 
International Finance Corporation is to “further economic development by 
encouraging the growth of productive private enterprise in member countries”). 
 220 Id. at art. 31(2)(a). 
 221 Id. at art. 31(2)(b). 
 222 For instance, the International Finance Corporation has a list of 
Performance Standards that define the scope and standards its projects must abide 
by. See Performance Standards, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, https://
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constituent documents and secondary material form the corpus of 
texts where the court can infer the IO’s function and purpose. 
i. Rights-Based Approach to Determining the IO’s Function and 
Purposes 
This functional approach also goes hand in hand with United 
States’ commitment to human rights and international legal norms. It 
is important to note that jus cogens and customary law violations would 
never fall within the IO’s function and purposes. In other words, IOs 
that facilitate international law violations could be subject to suit 
under this functional approach to IO immunity. This is because, by 
definition, these violations do not fall within the ambit of the 
functions and purposes of an IO. 
All member states party to IOs have various international law 
obligations. First, member states party to IOs are beholden to jus 
cogens norms. By definition, jus cogens norms are non-derogable and 
prevail over any inconsistent rule of international law.223 This is 
underscored by the VCLT, which states that a “is void if . . . it 
conflicts with a preemptory norm of general international law.”224 
Second, the majority of member states, including the United States, 
have ratified a whole slew of international human rights treaties that 
codified customary international laws. For instance, the United States 
has ratified the Convention International Covenant on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.225 Upon ratification, these 
treaties become “the supreme law of the land” under the Supremacy 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which grants treaties the status of 
federal law.226 The United States must comply with and implement 
 
www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/
sustainability-at-ifc/policies-standards/performance-standards (last visited Apr. 23, 
2020). These policies provide insight into how the IFC carries out its functions. 
 223 See CARTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 95. 
 224 Vienna Convention, supra note 214 art. 53, 64. 
 225 See United States Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH (July 24, 2009 12:24 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2009
/07/24/united-states-ratification-international-human-rights-treaties#. 
 226 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 
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provisions of the treaties, just like other domestic legislation.227 
Because of these commitments, IO member states are unable to enter 
treaties that violate these jus cogens and customary international law 
norms. IO’s constituent documents thus cannot incorporate or 
tolerate—whether explicitly or implicitly—jus cogens or customary 
international law violations. 
The bottom line is that under this rights-based functional 
approach, IOs may be subject to suit when the underlying activity 
implicates an international law violation, because the violation cannot 
fall within the functions and purpose of the IO. 
2. Identifying the Gravamen of the Lawsuit 
The second step of this functional approach is to determine 
the “gravamen” of the suit, the particular conduct on which the 
lawsuit is based. Courts already adopted this gravamen test in the 
FSIA context.228 To determine the gravamen of a lawsuit, courts 
should look to the “basis or foundation for a claim, those elements 
that, if proven, would entitle a plaintiff to relief.”229 
For instance, in OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, the court 
determined that the gravamen of the lawsuit is the “conduct that 
gives rise to the plaintiff’s cause of action.”230 In Sachs, the 
respondent sued an Austrian railway for injuries sustained while 
boarding a train in Austria. To determine whether the court had 
jurisdiction over the claims, the court analyzed what constituted the 
gravamen of the lawsuit. The court ultimately held that the gravamen 
was the act that injured the respondent: “the wrongful conduct and 
dangerous conditions in Austria.”231 
 
 227 The United States must comply with these treaties, subject to 
reservations, understandings, and declarations. CARTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 69-
72, 99-107. 
 228 See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 357 (1993); OBB 
Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 136 S. Ct. 390, 395 (2015). 
 229 Sachs, 136 S. Ct. at 395. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. at 396-97. 
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This gravamen test can also be adapted to the IO context, 
where the court should also hone into the central feature of the suit 
as the focus of the functional test. 
3. Does the IO’s Function and Purpose Overlap with the 
Gravamen of the Suit? 
Lastly, under this functional framework, the court should 
determine whether the gravamen of the suit falls within the function 
and purposes of the IO. If the gravamen of the suit overlaps with the 
function and purpose of the IO, the IO should be accorded 
immunity in U.S. courts. Conversely, however, if the gravamen does 
not overlap with the function and purposes of the IO, the court 
should not accord the IO immunity. Under this analysis, an 
international organization would only be entitled to what is strictly 
necessary for the exercise of its functions in the fulfilment of its 
purposes. 
B. In Defense of a Functional Approach 
Unlike the approach of applying FSIA whole cloth to 
immunity, a functional framework to IO immunity can overcome the 
challenges delineated in Part II. Moreover, this rights-based 
functional approach gives courts the flexibility to balance competing 
judicial values. 
First and foremost, a functional approach to IO immunity 
will allow courts to grant IOs the “same immunity” that foreign 
sovereigns currently enjoy.232 The conceptual bases for IO and 
foreign sovereign immunity are distinct.233 States derive immunity 
from their sovereignty, where states enjoy autonomy and 
independence from external interference.234 IOs, on the flip side, 
 
 232 See Jam, 139 S. Ct. 759, 761 (2019). 
 233 See supra Part III.B-C. 
 234 Sovereignty is defined as when “the legal authority or competence of a 
State [is] limited and limitable only by international law and not by the national law 
of another State.” Hans Kelsen, The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for 
International Organization, 53 YALE L J. 207, 208. 
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derive immunity to protect their functions and independence.235 But 
while an IO has no right to self-determination, it does have a right, 
coterminous with its obligations as set out in its constituent 
instruments, to set policies to fulfill its purposes.236 And so, foreign 
sovereigns and IOs do share something in common: both require 
jurisdictional immunity to protect their autonomous and independent 
functions. It stands to reason that within this commonality, courts are 
able to grant IOs the “same immunity from suit” that a foreign 
sovereign enjoys. 
Crucially, if IO immunity is exclusively based on this 
functional approach, IOs will then be entitled to the same level of 
protections as foreign sovereigns. As analyzed in Part III.A, foreign 
sovereigns enjoy much less legal protections than IOs. The FSIA is 
the exclusive basis of foreign sovereign immunity, while IOs enjoy up 
to four layers of immunities.237 But by narrowing immunities to this 
functional approach, IOs are more likely entitled to the same 
immunities as foreign sovereigns. 
Second, and relatedly, a functional approach is more faithful 
to the animating principles behind IO immunity.238 
Third, a functional approach avoids the interpretive issues 
that bedevil the application of FSIA exceptions to IO immunity. This 
is because a functional approach to IO immunity would not rely on 
the distinction between sovereign and private acts, as required under 
the FSIA’s commercial activity exception.239 Instead, this framework 
would start with the essential functions and purpose of the IO, and 
ask whether the activity underlying the suit falls within these 
functions. 
And lastly, on a policy level, the functional approach is more 
favorable because it allows courts to weigh the operational needs of 
IOs against other core judicial values. At the end of the day, IOs can 
 
 235 See supra Part III.B. 
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 237 See supra Part III.A. 
 238 See supra Part III.B. 
 239 See supra Part III.C. 
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be useful forums of international exchange, collaboration, and 
rulemaking. But this utility must also be balanced by considerations 
of accountability under the rule of law and fairness to litigants.240 By 
protecting only the core functions and purposes of an IO and carving 
out exceptions to immunity when IOs violate international law, this 
functional approach empowers courts to better balance competing 
judicial values. 
CONCLUSION 
IO immunity has undergone a sea change post-Jam. In this 
new age of restrictive liability, courts are now in unchartered waters 
when determining the level of immunity to accord IOs. Although it 
may be tempting to apply the body of law surrounding foreign 
sovereign immunity wholesale to the IO context, this approach is 
ultimately shortsighted and unworkable. Instead, this Article presents 
an alternative approach based on the functions of IOs. This 
functional framework not only addresses the interpretive challenges 
left open by Jam, but also allows courts to delicately balance the 
operational needs of IOs with accountability under the rule of law. 
  
 
 240 Herz, supra note 48, at 474-75. 
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TABLE I: LOCATION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 
HEADQUARTERS AND BREAKDOWN OF SUBJECT AREA 
IO Headquarters Number Percentage  
US 20 30% 
U.K. 4 6% 
France 7 10% 
Switzerland 11 16% 
Canada 5 7% 
Other  20 30% 
Total  67 100% 
IO Subject Area Number Percentage  
Financial Institution 14 21% 
Natural Resource/ 
Agriculture 11 16% 
Disputes 1 1% 
Trade 4 6% 
Technical Expertise 14 21% 
Human Condition 11 16% 
Political Alliance 12 18% 
Total  67 100% 
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APPENDIX I: OVERVIEW OF THE LEVEL OF IMMUNITY SPECIFIED BY 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION CONSTITUENT DOCUMENTS 
Organization  Status Executive 
Order 




















Agency (Privileges and 
Immunities) Order 
2017, art. III § 3: "The 
Agency, its property 
and assets, wherever 
located and by 
whomsoever held, 
shall enjoy immunity 
from every form of 
legal process except in 
so far as in any 
particular case the 
Assembly has 
expressly waived the 
immunity of the 
Agency. It is, 
however, understood 
that no waiver of 
immunity shall extend 
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of the Colorado and 
Tijuana Rivers and of 
the Rio Grande, art. 2: 
"The Commissioner, 
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secretary, designated 
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as members of its 
Section of the 
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entitled in the territory 
of the other country 


























the Regional Security 
System, art. 4 2(b) 
"agree that service 
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Member State taking 
part in operations in 
another Member State 
or in the territorial sea 
or exclU.S.ive 
economic zone of that 
other Member State 
shall have all the 
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on service personnel 
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State by the laws of 
that State." 




























Development Bank , 
art. XI § 4 " Immunity 
from legal process 
with respect to acts 
performed by them in 
their official capacity, 
except when the Bank 
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Corporation, art. VII § 
3: "Actions may be 
brought against the 
Corporation only in a 
court of competent 
jurisdiction in the 
territories of a 
member country in 
which the Corporation 
has an office, has 
appointed an agent for 
the purpose of 
accepting service or 
notice of process, or 
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§3: "Actions may be 
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Bank only in a court 
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Bank has an office, 
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Association Articles of 
Agreement, art. VIII § 
3: "Actions may be 
brought against the 
Association only in a 
court of competent 
jurisdiction in the 
territories of a 
member in which the 
Association has an 
office, has appointed 
an agent for the 
purpose of accepting 
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Articles of Agreement 
of the International 
Finance Corporation, 
art. 6 § 3: "Actions 
may be brought 
against the 
Corporation only in a 
court of competent 
jurisdiction in the 
territories of a 
member in which the 
Corporation has an 
office, has appointed 
an agent for the 
purpose of accepting 
service of process, or 
has issued or 
guaranteed securities. 
No actions shall, 
however, be brought 
by members or 
persons acting for or 
deriving claims from 
members. The 
property and assets of 
the Corporation shall, 
wheresoever located 
and by whomsoever 
held, be immune from 
all forms of seizure, 
attachment or 
execution before the 
delivery of final 
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Agency, Chap. VII, 
art. 44: "Actions other 
than those within the 
scope of Articles 57 
and 58 may be 
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Agency only in a court 
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member in which the 
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the Government of 
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Government of the 
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Development Bank, 
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may be brought 
against the Bank only 
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has appointed an 
agent for the purpose 
of accepting service or 
notice of process, or 
has issued or 
guaranteed securities." 
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Convention on the 
Privilegs and 
Immunities of the 
Specialized Agencies, 
art. 3 § 4:  "The 
specialized agencies, 
their property and 
assets, wherever 
located and by 
whomsoever held, 
shall enjoy immunity 
from every form of 
legal process except in 
so far as in any 
particular case they 
have expressly waived 
their immunity. It is, 
however,understood 
that no waiver of 
immunity shall extend 
to any measure of 
execution" 









Charter of the United 
Nations, art. 105 "The 
Organization shall 
enjoy in the territory 
of each of its 
Members such 
privileges and 
immunities as are 
necessary for the 
fulfillment of its 





Immunities of the 
United Nations, art. 
II, § 2: “The United 
Nations ... shall enjoy 
immunity from every 
form of legal process 
except insofar as in 
any particular case it 
has expressly waived 
its immunity”. 
















Agreement of 1962, 
art. 22(1): "The 
Organization shall 
have in the territory of 
each Member, to the 
extent consistent with 
its laws, such legal 
capacity as may be 
necessary for the 
exercise of its 











































Section  2(a): "The 
Organization shall 
enjoy in the territory 
of each of its 
Members such 
privileges and 
immunities as are 
necessary for the 
fulfilment of its 
purposes and the 
exercise of its 





Immunities of the 
United Nations, art. 
II, § 2: “The United 
Nations ... shall enjoy 
immunity from every 
form of legal process 
except insofar as in 
any particular case it 





















Protocol on the 
Privileges and 


























ns where  











Fund, art. 52(1): "The 
Bank shall enjoy 
immunity from every 
form of legal process 
except in cases arising 
out of the exercise of 
its borrowing powers 
when it may be sued 
only in a court of 
competent jurisdiction 
in 
the territory of a 
member in which the 
Bank has its principal 
office, or in the 
territory of a member 
or non-member State 
where 
it has appointed an 
agent for the purpose 
of accepting service 
or notice of process or 
has issued or 
guaranteed securities. 
No actions shall, 
however, be brought 
by members or 
persons 
acting for or deriving 
claims from 
members." 













The Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and 
Malaria, art. 2(1): "(1) 
The Global Fund, its 
property and assets, 
wherever located and 
by 
whomsoever held, 
shall enjoy immunity 
from every form of 
legal process except in 
so 
far as in a particular 
case it has expressly 
waived its immunity. " 
International 
Committee of the 
Red Cross 
























Constitution, art. 40 
"The International 
Labour Organization 
shall enjoy in the 
territory of each of its 
Members such 
privileges and 
immunities as are 
necessary for the 
















































Constitution, art. 23L 
"The Organization 
shall enjoy such 
privileges and 
immunities as are 
necessary for the 
exercise of its 
functions and the 
fulfilment of its 
purposes."    
Yes Absolute 
immunity 
Convention on the 
Privilegs and 
Immunities of the 
Specialized Agencies, 
art. 3 § 4:  "The 
specialized agencies, 
their property and 
assets, wherever 
located and by 
whomsoever held, 
shall enjoy immunity 
from every form of 
legal process except in 
so 
far as in any particular 
case they have 
expressly waived their 
immunity. It is, 
however,understood 
that no waiver of 
immunity shall extend 















Convention on the 
Privilegs and 
Immunities of the 
Specialized Agencies, 
art. 3 § 4:  "The 
specialized agencies, 
their property and 
assets, wherever 
located and by 
whomsoever held, 
shall enjoy immunity 
from every form of 
legal process except in 
so 
far as in any particular 
case they have 
expressly waived their 
immunity. It is, 
however,understood 
that no waiver of 
immunity shall extend 
to any measure of 
execution" 









Switzerland Trade Yes Absolute 
immunity 
Convention on the 
Privilegs and 
Immunities of the 
Specialized Agencies, 
art. 3 § 4:  "The 
specialized agencies, 
their property and 
assets, wherever 
located and by 
whomsoever held, 
shall enjoy immunity 
from every form of 
legal process except in 
so 
far as in any particular 
case they have 
expressly waived their 
immunity. It is, 
however,understood 
that no waiver of 
immunity shall extend 













Convention on the 
Privilegs and 
Immunities of the 
Specialized Agencies, 
art. 3 § 4:  "The 
specialized agencies, 
their property and 
assets, wherever 
located and by 
whomsoever held, 
shall enjoy immunity 
from every form of 
legal process except in 
so 
far as in any particular 
case they have 
expressly waived their 
immunity. It is, 
however,understood 
that no waiver of 
immunity shall extend 














Convention on the 
Privilegs and 
Immunities of the 
Specialized Agencies, 
art. 3 § 4:  "The 
specialized agencies, 
their property and 
assets, wherever 
located and by 
whomsoever held, 
shall enjoy immunity 
from every form of 
legal process except in 
so 
far as in any particular 
case they have 
expressly waived their 
immunity. It is, 
however,understood 
that no waiver of 
immunity shall extend 













Agreement, art. VIII, 
§ 2: "The WTO shall 
be accorded by each 
of its Members such 
privileges and 
immunities as 
are necessary for the 
exercise of its 










Spain Trade Yes Absolute 
immunity 
Convention on the 
Privilegs and 
Immunities of the 
Specialized Agencies, 
art. 3 § 4:  "The 
specialized agencies, 
their property and 
assets, wherever 
located and by 
whomsoever held, 
shall enjoy immunity 
from every form of 
legal process except in 
so 
far as in any particular 
case they have 
expressly waived their 
immunity. It is, 
however,understood 
that no waiver of 
immunity shall extend 
























States, "The privileges 
and immunities to be 
granted to the senior 
officials of the 
Organisation at its 
headquarters and in 
the Member States 
shall be the same 
accorded to members 
of a diplomatic 
mission accredited at 
the headquarters of 
the Organisation and 
in the Member States 
under the provisions 
of the Vienna 
Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations 
of 18 April 1961. 
Similarly the privileges 
and immunities 
granted to the 
Secretariat at the 
headquarters of the 
Organisation shall be 
the same as granted to 
diplomatic missions at 
the headquarters of 
the Organisation and 
in the Member States 
under the said 
Convention." 















ns where  









Establishing the Asian 
Development Bank, 
art. 50(1): "The Bank 
shall enjoy immunity 
from every form of 
legal process, except 
in cases arising 
out of or in 
connection with the 
exercise of its powers 
to borrow money, to 
guarantee obligations, 
or to buy 
and sell or underwrite 
the sale of securities, 
in which cases actions 
may be brought 
against the Bank in a 
court of competent 
jurisdiction in the 
territory of a country 
in which the Bank has 
its principal or a 
branch 
office, or has 
appointed an agent for 
the purpose of 
accepting service or 
notice of process, or 
















the Prohibition of 
Chemical 
Weapons 









Convention on the 
Prohibition of the 
Development, 
Production, 
Stockpiling and U.S.e 
of Chemical Weapons 
and on Their 
Destruction, Chap. E, 
art. 48: "The 
Organization shall 
enjoy on the territory 
and in any other place 
under the jurisdiction 
or control of a State 
Party such legal 
capacity and such 
privileges and 
immunities as are 
necessary for the 


















Amended by the 
Protocol Dated 14 
April 2005 That 
Entered Into Force on 
8 November 2016, art. 
XIII: "In the territory 
of each of its Member 
States it shall enjoy, 
subject to agreement 
with the Member State 
concerned, such 
privileges and 
immunities as may be 
necessary for the 
exercise of its 
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functions and the 

















Establisment of a 
Border Environment 
Cooperation 
Commission and a 
North American 
Development Bank, 
art. 4, § 3: "The 
Commission, its 
property and its assets, 
wherever located, and 
by whomsoever held, 
shall enjoy the same 
immunity from suit 
and every form of 
judicial process as is 
enjoyed by foreign 
governments, except 
to the extent that the 
Commission may 
expressly waive its 
immunity for the 
purposes of any 
proceedings or by the 


































Convention on the 
Privilegs and 
Immunities of the 
Specialized Agencies, 
art. 3 § 4:  "The 
specialized agencies, 
their property and 
assets, wherever 
located and by 
whomsoever held, 
shall enjoy immunity 
from every form of 
legal process except in 
so 
far as in any particular 
case they have 
expressly waived their 
immunity. It is, 
however,understood 
that no waiver of 
immunity shall extend 
to any measure of 
execution" 



























Convention on the 
Privilegs and 
Immunities of the 
Specialized Agencies, 
art. 3 § 4:  "The 
specialized agencies, 
their property and 
assets, wherever 
located and by 
whomsoever held, 
shall enjoy immunity 
from every form of 
legal process except in 
so 
far as in any particular 
case they have 
expressly waived their 
immunity. It is, 
however,understood 
that no waiver of 
immunity shall extend 














1981 Protocol to the 
1979 Egypt-Israel 
Peace Treaty "the 
MFO enjoys immunity 
from the civil and 
criminal jurisdiction of 
































Protocol on the 
Privileges and 





that, in accordance 
with Article 28 of the 
Treaty establishing a 
Single Council and a 




Communities and the 
European Investment 
Bank shall enjoy in the 
territories of the 
Member 
States such privileges 
and immunities as are 
necessary for the 
performance of their 
tasks" 




Respect of the 





















Group of States 
Against Corruption - 
GRECO, art. 6(3): 
"The representatives 
appointed to the 
GRECO shall enjoy 
the privileges and 
immunities applicable 
under Article 2 of the 
Protocol to the 
General Agreement 
on Privileges and 





























Convention for the 
Establishment of a 
European Space 
Agency, Convention: 
Annex I, art. IV, § 1 
("The Agency shall 
have immunity from 
jurisdiction and 
execution, except: 
a. to the extent that it 
shall, by decision of 
the Council, have 
expressly waived such 
















































Agreement on the 
privileges and 
immunities of the 
ITER International 
FU.S.ion Energy 
Organization for the 
Joint Implementation 
of the ITER Project, 
art. 13(1) 
("Representatives of 
the Parties shall, while 
exercising their 
functions as a 
representative and in 
the course of their 
journeys to and from 
the place of meeting 
convened by the 
ITER Organization, 
enjoy the following 
privileges and 
immunities") 
















Protocol No. 1 to the 
Convention for 
European Economic 
Cooperation on the 
Legal Capacity, 
Privileges and 




that according to the 
provisions of Article 
22 of the Convention, 
the Organisation for 
European Economic 
Co-operation shall 
enjoy in the territory 
of each of its 
Members such legal 
capacity as may be 
necessary for the 
exercise of its 
functions and the 
















Convention on the 
Privilegs and 
Immunities of the 
Specialized Agencies, 
art. 3 § 4:  "The 
specialized agencies, 
their property and 
assets, wherever 
located and by 
whomsoever held, 
shall enjoy immunity 
from every form of 
legal process except in 
so 
far as in any particular 
case they have 
expressly waived their 
immunity. It is, 
however,understood 
that no waiver of 
immunity shall extend 


































































































































Agreement on the 
Privileges and 
Immunities of the 
International Atomic 
Energy Agency, Art. 
III § 3: "The Agency, 
its property and assets, 
wherever located and 
by whomsoever held, 
shall enjoy immunity 
from every form of 
legal process except in 
so far as in any 
particular case it has 
expressly waived its 
immunity. It is, 
however, understood 
that no waiver of 
immunity shall extend 















Convention on the 
Privilegs and 
Immunities of the 
Specialized Agencies, 
art. 3 § 4:  "The 
specialized agencies, 
their property and 
assets, wherever 
located and by 
whomsoever held, 
shall enjoy immunity 
from every form of 
legal process except in 
so 
far as in any particular 
case they have 
expressly waived their 
immunity. It is, 
however,understood 
that no waiver of 
immunity shall extend 
to any measure of 
execution" 





















     
Commission for 




















































     
International 
Civilian Office in 
Kosovo 







     
International 
Cotton Institute 
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